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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
Original Parties [See Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291]:

1.

KaLvnn Ninow,
Petitioner,

M*» William Lowe; ^ # Augusta Rose; Hr# Robert Mortensen; and
ZJm Grand Staircase Land Co., a Utah corporation,
Respondents.
Augusta Rose,
Third-party Petitioner,
v.
KaLynn Ninow, " • Ryan Pahl and / • Richard Ninow, and Does I-V,
Third-party Respondents.

Additional party added by the trial court's URCP 42 order [April 15, 2004]
consolidating two shareholder derivative actions during the pendency of the
prior appeal [See Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291, n. 10]:

O • Diamond Fork Land Company, a Utah corporation, as relator in a
shareholder derivative action against KaLynn Ninow to assert the rights of
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., a Utah corporation not a party to this
matter, and as relator in a second shareholder derivative action against Ryan
Pahl to assert rights of Pahl's Land Partnership, not a party to this matter,
[formerly know, inter alia, as GHF Investments or GHF Investment
Partnership], by and through its general partner, PahPs Salt Palace Loan
Office, Inc., a Utah corporation not a party to this action. Said shareholder
derivate actions brought under Civil Case No. 020908627 and Civil Case
No. 030907064 were ordered consolidated April 15, 2004. (R. 1421-1424).]
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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under UCA Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j)
over the appeal transferred from the Supreme Court and jurisdiction under
UCA Sec. 78-2a-3(l) and (2) to "issue all writs and process necessary" to
"carry into effect" Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of PahD 2004 UT App 291 "in aid
of its [appellate] jurisdiction" over the District Court, Third Judicial District.
Appellants5 brief was timely filed on April 26, 2006. This amended
brief is filed pursuant to the orders of the Court of Appeals to file a new
brief after multiple remands to the trial court to correct the record on appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The Court of Appeals should carry into effect its September 2, 2004,

Memorandum Decision in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of PahlV 2004 UT App.
291, and vindicate its appellate jurisdiction over the Third District Court by
reversing all interlocutory and final orders entered by the trial court after the
trial court signed its Ruling and Order on April 26, 2005, [R. 2609], except
for those portions of the Final Order on the May 29, 2002, Petition signed
by the trial court on August 16, 2005, not being challenged on this appeal.
Standard of Appellate Review - Because the trial court disregarded the law
of the case established in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of PahD 2004 UT App 291,
-1-

this is a matter of vindicating appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over the Third District Court. As such, it presents a question of law as to
which the Court of Appeals has express statutory jurisdiction under UCA
Sec. 78-2a-3(l) and (2) to "issue all writs and process necessary" to "carry
into effect" Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl) 2004 UT App 291 "in aid of its
[appellate] jurisdiction" without giving any deference at all to the trial court.
Preservation of the Issue - Preserved at R. 1634. After Judge Medley
entered a consolidation order consolidating two civil cases into this probate
proceeding on April 15, 2004, while it was on appeal in Ninow v. Lowe I,
William Lowe and Augusta Rose filed a Post-Consolidation Answer and
Responsive Memorandum with URCP 7 Request to Submit Motion for
Decision [R. 1634] and the Affidavit of William Lowe [R. 1637]. They
alerted the trial court that KaLynn Ninow was arguing on appeal that the
May 1, 2003, final order addressed only ownership of shares of stock and
was arguing that claims for interests in real estate still remained pending in
the trial court. [R. 1634] Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose indicated that they were
not waiving their position that the May 1, 2003, judgment was not a partial
summary judgment, but that it concluded the proceeding on the May 29,
2002, petition as to both share ownership claims that had been litigated
-2-

without ever joining the necessary parties and real estate claims that could
have been litigated, but were not litigated, and did not survive the May 1,
2003, final order. [R. 1364] Ninow v. Lowe I was itself a consolidation
of two appeals in which Ms. Ninow initially argued that there was no final,
appealable order because, she argued, Judge Medley actually granted only
partial summary judgment as to the portion of the claims dealing with the
ownership of the 6,000 shares of PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. ("Loan
Office") and that the May 29, 2002, Probate Petition is still pending because
the second portion of the claims, dealing with the ownership of certain State
Street property, has yet to be adjudicated. The Court of Appeals reserved
this question for plenary consideration. After the first appeal was filed, Ms
Ninow approached the trial court and secured URCP 60(b)(1) relief in the
form of the May 1, 2003, summary judgment based on "inadvertence" by
arguing that she had "inadvertently" failed to submit it as a proposed order
prior to the first notice of appeal. A second notice of appeal was filed, she
conceded that the second notice of appeal was from a final, appealable order,
and the two appeals were then consolidated. In rendering its memorandum
decision in Ninow v. Lowe I [Estate of Pahl], 2004 UT App. 291, the Court
of Appeals ruled that the appeal was from a "final, appealable order," as to
-3-

the entire consolidated appeal, thus creating the law of the case on the issue
reserved for plenary consideration, rejecting KaLynn Ninow's contention,
2.

It was error for the trial court to remove William Lowe and Augusta

Rose as officers and directors of PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., in the
final order signed August 16, 2005, [1] because this went beyond the scope
of this court's remand in Ninow v. Lowe I TEstate of PahlL 2004 UT App.
291 and [2] because there is no legal basis for their removal and they have
the right to continue to serve as directors until their successors are qualified.
Standard of Appellate Review - The issue presented for appellate review
requires the Utah Court of Appeals to construe the Utah Revised Business
Corporation Act on the question of whether it provides a statutory legal basis
for judicial removal under this record. Such construction of a Utah statute
presents a question of law as to which the Utah Court of Appeals gives no
deference to the trial court. Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT
46, 122 P.3rd 556. Further, since the trial court disregarded the law of the
case established in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl) 2004 UT App 291, by
entering an order that exceeded the scope of the remand in that decision, this
is a matter of vindicating appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
the Third District Court. As such, it presents a question of law as to which
-4-

the Court of Appeals has express statutory jurisdiction under UCA Sec. 782a-3(l) and (2) to "issue all writs and process necessary" to "carry into
effect" Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl) 2004 UT App 291 "in aid of its
[appellate] jurisdiction" without giving any deference at all to the trial court.
Preservation of the Issue - In her ruling and order of May 26, 2005
[at R. 2789], the trial court makes a record that Mr. Lowe argued that the
May 1, 2003, summary judgment did not preclude other individuals and
entities from pursuing an ownership interest in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan
Office, Inc., shares. The issue was thus preserved. Mr. Lowe's argument
was consistent with the law of the case established when Hon. Tyrone E.
Medley, faced with a motion by Diamond Fork Land Company to dismiss
the two shareholder derivative actions that had been consolidated into this
proceeding based on Diamond Fork Land Company's transfer of all of its
ownership interest in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., shares, dismissed
without prejudice as moved for by Diamond Fork Land Company, rather
than with prejudice, as moved for by KaLynn Ninow and Ryan Pahl. [Supp
R. 376; Supp R. 385]. The purpose of that argument was to demonstrate that
William Lowe and Augusta Rose had never been removed as officers and
directors and that the court should not remove them under the Utah Revised
-5-

Business Corporation Act [1] because the May 1, 2003, summary judgment
order was not binding upon Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc.; its record
shareholders on its official shareholder list; and their successors, who all
have an interest adverse to the one claimed by KaLynn Ninow; [2] because
the text in the body of the summary judgment order contained no language
removing officers and directors, but only addressed share ownership; [3]
because, by rule, the underlying finding of undisputed summary judgment
fact that Lowe and Rose had been removed and replaced had never been
incorporated into the summary judgment order itself [which contained no
removal language] as an order and, by rule, such an undisputed summary
judgment finding of fact for purposes of a May 1, 2003, summary judgment
could not provide any basis for any order of removal on August 16, 2005,
since, under URCP 7, 56, and former CJA 4-501, the summary judgment
facts that are deemed undisputed are so deemed only for purposes of the
summary judgment order itself and cannot form the factual basis for any
other orderfs]; [4] because the summary judgment issue had never been
litigated by the corporation, its record shareholders, and successors who
claimed a voting interest adverse to Ms. Ninow's claims and who were not
bound by the declination of the named parties to controvert the undisputed
-6-

material facts, since the named parties claimed no shareholder voting rights,
were not agents of the record shareholders, and, in the case of William Lowe
and Augusta Rose, were preliminarily enjoined by the court from litigating
in a representative capacity as officers of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office,
Inc., and were never sued in their representative capacities; and, [5] because
PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., by and through William Lowe, had
given actual notice to KaLynn Ninow that he, as a corporate officer, acting
on behalf of the corporation, had rejected the attempt by KaLynn Ninow to
vote 100% of the shares, that he had done so based upon the corporation's
official shareholder records that showed she lacked sufficient shares to form
a quorum to unilaterally vote her shares, and that this rejection of her votes
still stands because she has never challenged the rejection before a court of
competent jurisdiction in a case to which PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office,
Inc., was made a party. The court rejected this argument as "convoluted"
and "simply not credible" [R.2787], thereby preserving it, and, based upon
that rejection, later signed the August 16, 2005, order on appeal, removing
William Lowe and Augusta Rose as the officers and directors. [R. 3200]
3.

Because no cross-appeal was filed, and because no URCP 60(b)

motion was filed in the trial court within three months of August 19, 2005,
-7-

the Court of Appeals should reverse only that portion of the final order now
on appeal [R. 3200] that removes William Lowe and Augusta Rose as the
officers and directors and should hold that they have never been removed or
replaced. There should be no remand of the final order to the trial court.
Standard of Appellate Review - Because this is an issue involving the
management of the appeal, rather than an issue of appellate review of a trial
court order, it presents a question of law for the appellate court, since this
court has jurisdiction over the appeal. UCA Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j).
Preservation of the Issue - The issue was preserved by filing a notice of
appeal [R. 3303] in the trial court, thus vesting this court with jurisdiction.
4.

Because no notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of November

26, 2002, and because no URCP 60(b) motion was filed in the trial court
within three months of November 26, 2002, the Court of Appeals should
reinstate the November 26, 2002, default judgment in Civil No 020908627
and reverse the June 12, 2003, sua sponte order setting aside that default
judgment as an erroneous order improvidently entered by the trial court.
Standard of Appellate Review - "Section 78-40-13 of the Utah Code
governs default judgments in quiet title actions. It specifies that a default
'judgment shall be conclusive against all the persons named in the summons
-8-

and complaint who have been served.' Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-13 (2002).
'The statute's plain language clearly provides that if a person is properly
named in the summons and complaint and served, a default judgment is
valid and conclusive against him or her.' " State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22;
70 P.3d 111. This issue requires the Court of Appeals to construe Utah
Code Ann. § 78-40-13 and to also construe the 3-month deadline under
URCP 60(b). Construction of a rule or statute presents an issue of law as to
which no deference is given to the trial court. Still Standing Stable, LLC v.
Allen, 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3rd 556.
Preservation of the Issue - After the order of consolidation was entered on
April 15, 2004, consolidating Civil No 020908627 into the May 29, 2002,
probate petition proceeding then on appeal, William Lowe and Augusta
Rose, having been involuntarily made parties to a consolidated proceeding
over their objection, pled their Answer [R. 1634]. They pled that they
"support the default judgment of November 26, 2002, because KaLynn
Ninow did not timely respond to the summons. They support as correct
Judge Hilder's bench ruling on May 2, 2003, that URCP 60(b) relief was
unavailable to Ms. Ninow because she did not timely move for URCP 60(b)
relief within the required three months. They object to Judge Hilder's
-9-

minute entry order of June 12, 2003, as incorrectly applying the holding in
the case of Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46, 63
P.3rd 1008, because that case holding would apply here only if Ms. Ninow
had diligently attempted to ascertain whether default had been entered and
had been misled by the court. No such finding was made as to Ms. Ninow,
who did not file her tardy response to the summons until the day default was
entered and then took no steps during the next three months to see if default
had been entered and did not file her URCP 60(b) motion based on
inadvertence and mistake until after the three-month deadline under URCP
60(b) for filing such motions. These respondents join in the pending motion
dated July 2, 2003, to vacate the June 12, 2003, order setting aside the
default judgment. Pursuant to URCP 7, they request decision on that
motion." [R. 1635-1636] The trial court entered an interlocutory bench
ruling denying the July 2, 2003, motion to vacate on April 6, 2005. [R. 2555
- Minute Entry - "Mr.Copier makes a motion in regards to the ruling on
6/12/03 be vacated. The court orders the motion to vacate is denied."] A
final order was signed on August 16, 2005, and entered on August 19, 2005.
A notice of appeal was filed on September 15, 2005, appealing the final
order "together with all prior orders entered under or consolidated into this
-10

probate that have not previously been reviewed on the merits by an appellate
court, including, but not limited to, the order by Judge Hilder setting aside
the default judgment, the order by Judge Lewis denying the motion to vacate
the order by Judge Hilder setting aside the default judgment... ." [R. 3303]
5.

Because no cross-appeal was filed in Ninow v. Lowe L and because

no URCP 60(b) motion was filed in Ninow v. Lowe I within three months of
May 1, 2003, it was error and a violation of appellate law of the case for the
trial court to exceed the scope of the remand in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of
Pahll, 2004 UT App. 291, by ordering, on May 26, 2005, that the final,
appealable order affirmed on appeal was only a "partial" summary judgment
because real estate claims supposedly remained pending in the trial court and
the preliminary injunction supposedly remained in effect. It was a violation
of appellate law of the case to so "retroactively" extend the old preliminary
injunction. It was also error to enter the May 26, 2005, order [as it was error
to enter any of the other interlocutory and final orders on the merits after
April 26, 2005], because the only matters pending before the trial court after
April 26, 2005, were KaLynn Ninow's serial contempt motions and a court
presiding over a contempt matter has no jurisdiction to enter orders on the
merits and no right to enter contempt-type relief absent a contempt finding.
-11-

Standard of Appellate Review - Because Judge Lewis disregarded the law
of the case established in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate ofPahD 2004 UT App 291,
this is a matter of vindicating appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over the Third District Court. As such, it presents a question of law as to
which the Court of Appeals has express statutory jurisdiction under UCA
Sec. 78-2a-3(l) and (2) to "issue all writs and process necessary" to "carry
into effect" Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl) 2004 UT App 291 "in aid of its
[appellate] jurisdiction" without giving any deference at all to the trial court.
The question of whether the order [and similar orders entered after April 26,
2005], exceeded the scope of the trial court's jurisdiction [because the only
matters pending were Ms. Ninow's serial contempt motions, there was never
an order entered finding anyone in contempt, and there was thus no basis
upon which to enter any orders, let alone orders on the merits that exceed the
scope of the relief available for contempt], presents a question of law as to
which this court gives no deference to the trial court. Homever (In Re
Cannatella) v. Stagg Associates. 2006 UT App. 89; 132 P.2d 284.
Preservation of the Issue - [R. 2555 - Minute Entry - "Counsel argues the
order to show cause. The Court takes the order to show cause under
advisement and will issue a written ruling.] [R. 2787 - (written ruling)]
-12-

[Appealed, Notice of Appeal, R. 3303 - appealing the interlocutory "orders
and rulings extending the preliminary injunction beyond the grant in 2002 of
the summary judgment adjudicating the underlying merits of the May 29,
2002, probate petition."]
6.

Because William Lowe's motion to the court to set a hearing on the

TRO undertaking and to give notice to the surety of the hearing fairly fell
within the scope of the remand in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of PahD 2004 UT
App 291, it was error for the trial court to deny the motion to set the hearing.
Standard of Appellate Review - URCP 65A(c)(3) uses the discretionary
word "may" but it also employs the word "shall" once the motion is filed.
The discretionary "may" is the discretion of Mr. Lowe to move in the instant
proceeding or, in the alternative, to file an "independent action" against the
surety, or both, while the mandatory "shall" applies to the court in setting the
hearing and in specifying what notice is to be given once the movant elects
to proceed against the surety in the instant proceeding and it applies to the
court clerk, as a ministerial officer, in the giving of such notice once such a
hearing is set. The question before the court is a question of construction of
URCP 65A(c)(3) and its mandatory language once, as in this case, a motion
is filed, which is a question of law as to which no deference is given to the
-13-

trial court. Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3 m 556.
Preservation of the Issue - [R. 2555 - Minute Entry - "Mr.Copier argues
the issue of the undertaking. Ms. Weeks gives opposing arguments. The
court orders the motion for the undertaking is denied."] [Appealed, Notice
of Appeal, R. 3303 - appealing the interlocutory "order denying the motion
to proceed against the surety who made the TRO undertaking . . . ." ]
7.

The removal of the appellants as officer/directors on August 16, 2005,

is a correct rendering of an erroneous underlying May 26, 2005, court ruling.
Standard of Appellate Review - Since the trial court signed the August 16,
2005, proposed order as submitted, it is a correct rendering of the underlying
May 26, 2005, ruling. Since the underlying May 26, 2005, ruling was error
because it exceeded the relief that was available in the contempt proceeding
that was the only matter that survived the April 6, 2005, bench order, and no
one was properly held in contempt, this is a de novo issue of lav/. Homever
(In Re Cannatella) v. Stagg Associates, 2006 UT App. 89; 132 P.2d 284.
Preservation of the Issue - [R. 2555 - Minute Entry - "Counsel argues the
order to show cause. The Court takes the order to show cause under
advisement and will issue a written ruling.] [R. 2787 - (written ruling)]
[Appealed, Notice of Appeal, R. 3303 - appealing the "all prior orders . . .
-14-

that have not previously been reviewed on the merits by an appellate court.]
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES APPENDED HERETO
UCA Sec. 16-1 Oa-809. Removal of directors by judicial proceeding.
UCA Sec. 75-3-106. Scope of proceedings - Proceedings independent Exception.
URAP 4(d). Additional or cross-appeal.
URCP 60. Relief from judgment or order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A formal petition within an informal probate was filed by KaLynn
Ninow on May 29, 2002. The formal proceeding on that formal petition was
concluded with a summary judgment on May 1, 2003. The Utah Court of
Appeals decided that the May 1, 2003, summary judgment constituted a
final, appealable order and affirmed it. Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl)
2004 UT App 291. In that same decision, the Court of Appeals reversed a
portion of an interlocutory contempt order that had held William Lowe in
contempt of court and remanded for the limited purpose of ordering that the
attorney fee award that Mr. Lowe had paid to Ms. Ninow be returned to Mr.
Lowe. While that appeal was pending before the Utah Court of Appeals,
Hon. Tyrone E. Medley entered an order on April 15, 2004, consolidating
-15-

two civil shareholder derivative actions into this proceeding [See Ninow v.
Lowe (Estate of Pahl\ 2004 UT App. 291, n. 10]. After that appeal was
decided, KaLynn Ninow began filing a series of serial contempt motions that
were largely identical and based on the same subject matter and contentions.
The trial court signed an order on April 26, 2005, [R.2609] in which it
disposed of all matters arising out of the remand ordered in the prior appeal,
all matters arising out of the two consolidated civil shareholder derivative
actions that had been ordered consolidated during the prior appeal, and all
matters arising out of the serial contempt motions filed to-date [with the
conclusion that there had been no contempt by any alleged contemnors]. In
an attempt to perpetuate the dispute, KaLynn Ninow continued to file more
of her serial contempt motions and the trial court entered further orders after
April 26, 2005, and entered the August 16, 2005 final order now on appeal.
In contravention of the appellate law of the case established by this
court and of her own law of the case established on April 26, 2005, the trial
court erroneously ruled on May 26, 2005, that real estate issues supposedly
remained pending before her under the May 29, 2002, petition. Having so
erred, the court then signed a final order on the May 29, 2002, petition on
August 16, 2005, that adjudicated only one additional matter on the merits of
-16-

the May 29, 2002, petition beyond that which was contained in the earlier
May 1, 2003, final order. That one additional matter was the judicial
removal of William Lowe and Augusta Rose as officers and directors of
PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., a Utah corporation. This is challenged
on appeal because [1] the proceeding on the May 29, 2002, petition was
concluded with the May 1, 2003, order and it was error and a violation of the
appellate law of the case established in Ninow v. Lowe [Estate of Pahll,
2004 UT App. 291 to reopen it and remove William Lowe and Augusta
Rose as officers and directors when the only matter before the court was a
contempt proceeding; [2] there was no legal basis under the Utah Revised
Business Corporation Act to remove William Lowe and Augusta Rose as
officers and directors; and, [3] instead of fostering a trial court litigation
environment in which proper parties were brought before the trial court and
given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the merits, the court employed
contempt and injunctive powers as well as various rulings, orders, and
judicial comments to "chill" and "discourage" parties and potential parties.
This appeal presents a strange procedural posture because, on more
than one occasion, KaLynn Ninow failed to appeal, cross-appeal, or move
under URCP 60(b) within three months, but was still able to get a trial court
-17-

to grant URCP 60(b)-type relief. This strange procedural posture has been
exacerbated by KaLynn Ninow's excessive preoccupation with the attorney
for the respondents and her attempts to show that he is in bad faith and in
contempt, rather than focusing on the law, the facts, and the legal merits.
While all of the orders and rulings entered after April 26, 2005, were
error because the only matters pending before the court were Ms. Ninow's
serial contempt motions and there was, thus, no jurisdiction to enter orders
on the merits [and, since no one was found to be in contempt, there was also
no basis for ordering contempt-type relief either], the appellants challenge
only a portion of the final order of August 16, 2005. Since no Rule 60(b)
motion was filed within 3 months and no cross-appeal was filed, portions of
the August 16, 2005, final order not being challenged on appeal will stand
even though a timely challenge might have caused the order to be reversed.
FACTS
1.

On August 15, 2000, KaLynn Ninow filed a petition for formal
adjudication of intestacy and formal appointment of personal
representative. [R.1]

2.

On September 16, 2000, the August 15, 2000, petition was concluded
by an order making the appointment and adjudicating that Gary Pahl
-18-

died intestate. [R.18] [See UCA Sec. 75-3-106(d)] [the proceeding
was "concluded by an order making or declining the appointment."]
No other petition

SCCKHI^. U iiiiui

xuxici w as filed until Ma> 29, 2002
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Xhe May 29, 2002, petition yielded two orders on the merits:
\„. A n August 20, 2002, interlocutory order dismissing Robert K.
Mortensen with prejudice and ordering him to submit his resignation
a^ an < nceram; , . J U U , O; *\U:,

'

. , _., .

.,

. ^ Inc ,

interlocutory order was entered ordering William Lowe and Ati- ^ta
Rose i _•* A Mini their resignations and file it with ihc court and there
was no language in any interlociitory order prior to May 1 2003. or in
the I II ia I oi dei entned on May 1 2003, that judicially removed them.]
Illll , I Li1, II , 110 I
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the motion for sumniar judgment tiled by the personal representative
of the estate of Gary Pahl was granted and that uaiy Pahl was the
owner of all 6,000 shares of stock of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office,
Inc., at the time of his ucaii., aim ail o\ saiu
Ill; 5 • -

-J.M.W

,nares are part of
•

•

the property belonging to the Estate of Gary Pahl, and Ryan Pahl as
the only devisee of the estate. [R.1114] The May 1, 2003, order was a
"final, appealable order" affirmed appeal in Ninow v. Lowe [Estate of
Pahl], 2004 UT App 291. During the pendency of the appeal of the
May 1, 2003, order, the trial court entered an order of consolidation
on April 15, 2004, by which it consolidated two civil cases into the
May 29, 2002, petition. [Civil Case No. 020908627 and Civil Case
No. 030907064.] [R. 1421] The [1] remand of an interlocutory order
of contempt that was reversed on appeal; [2] litigation of the two civil
cases that were consolidated into this matter during the prior appeal;
and; [3] order on contempt motions pursued by Ms. Ninow, were the
subject of an order signed by the trial court on April 26, 2005, that
expressly stated "this shall constitute the final order as to all claims
and all parties to any and all proceedings under this probate number.'9
[R. 2609] After signing this order on April 26, 2005, the trial court
erroneously entertained further of Ms. Ninow's contempt motions that
were based upon the very allegations that had been disposed-of by the
order of April 26, 2005, and erroneously signed interlocutory orders
up to September 15, 2005. A final order was signed August 16, 2005.
-20-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
•1.

4 11. of the legal issues raised on appeal can be decided in... favor of the

appellants W Illiairi. I .owe and Augusta Rose by appl) ing the law of the case.
2.

liciaiiM 1 Kill ) mi IJiiiniw did mil ti|>|H,MII \ i iiilllllliiiii Hhih\ s al Nmniill
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should reverse the June 12, 2003, order that set aside the Default Judgment.
3.

Because KaLynn Ninow did not cross-appeal within the time allowed

and also did noi mm h i^r^-r within 3 months of August 19, 2005, for relief
untie,

nil
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.
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the August 16, 2005, final order ordering the removal of officers/directors.
4.

Ihe trial court should have held .-. hearing on the $20,000 undertaking.
ARGUMENT

Point One - Law of the case should be applied to decide this appeal.
<

shares of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., at the time oi ins
death and that they are part, of his estate being probated in the Third District
Court that was affirmed on appeal in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), ?0fU
! J I \pp 291, did not vest the personal representative with title to the shares

free of adverse claims and liens [because no published notice of the action
was given under Titles 75 or 78 of the Utah Code] and did not vest her with
the legal right to vote those shares [because Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office,
Inc., was never made a party to the action, it has the right to designate its
record shareowners entitled to vote subject to judicial review by a court of
competent jurisdiction in an action to which the corporation is a party, and
this was not such an action, nor was it a party to this action]. Thus, the legal
title to 3000 of the shares that was extinguished in the November 26, 2002,
Default Judgment against her and quieted in favor of out-of-state owners is
also not free of adverse claims and liens. It is only free of all adverse claims
and liens asserted by her. The title remains out-of-state beyond the in rem
jurisdictional reach of Utah courts and the purpose of getting the Default
Judgment reinstated on this appeal is to preclude her from trying to sue any
of the current out-of-state owners. This is consistent with the moderately
sophisticated business succession planning done by the late Gary G. Pahl,
who had no desire to have his estranged ex-wife, KaLynn Ninow, control the
corporation and did not desire to turn it over to his son, who was too young
to have demonstrated whether or not he had any aptitude to run a pawn shop
and, who, as de facto owner since May of 2002, has shown he lacks such an
-22-

aptitude, as the pawn shop is now temporarily closed. He will be better of r
as a 50% shareholder and ordinary creditor of the corporation as it pursues
its legal claims and resumes operations once its officers and a quorum <. .. :
dun-dors, (ip(K-lLiinl i Willi.iiii I H\H i ml \ii),u ilii I in <. ! , in in s11IHI• <«Ii lu iifli- i
thi 01 igl; rtl lis appeal Pa\ v i :t lending is a specialty i lie 1 ic business that requires
a specialized skill set. Some people have what it takes to be good at it and
some people don't have what it takes, Because no successors have ever
been qualified, William... I ,owe and Augusta Rose, as a. quorum of directors.,,,
suceesoium .

........,.;.

corporal

lawsuits were commenced that arc now part of the consolidated proceeding
that is now on appeal. The first of these lawsuits was a UCA Sec, 75-3-106
probate proceeding initiated by KaLynn Ninow as the petitioner on May 29,
because she did mil |om I'alil t» Sail I'alaci I oaii IIIdec, Inc., as a
ncccssan and indispensable pailv, a f.haie cluiinanl !r a beneficial intcicl in
shares transferred by shareholders of record, Diamond Fork Land Company,
filed separate shareholder derivative-actions, one against KaLynn Ninow as
personal representative and one against Ryan Pahl as the late Gary Pahl's
son. and sole heii A significant bod) ol Lrv\ of the case has since developed.
«! I -

•

Ms. Ninow's May 29, 2002, petition was concluded with a May 1,
2003, final order that declared that all 6000 shares of Pahfs Salt Palace
Loan Office, Inc., had belonged to Gary Pahl at death and were part of his
estate. While this made KaLynn Ninow the proper defendant as personal
representative in a shareholder derivative suit, it did not make her a record
shareholder entitled to vote, because Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc.,
was not a party, its officers and directors were not sued in any kind of
representative capacity, but were, instead, preliminarily enjoined from
binding the corporation, and it is the corporation that has the legal right to
designate its record voting shareholders subject to judicial review by a court
of competent jurisdiction in a case to which the corporation is a party. The
May 1, 2003, judgment was affirmed on appeal. That affirmation means
Ms. Ninow was the proper defendant in the shareholder derivative suit but
did not give her a right to vote shares because the corporation is not bound.
Meanwhile, one of the shareholder derivative actions concluded with
a final order of Default Judgment on November 26, 2002. It was set aside
on June 12, 2003. Both actions were then dismissed without prejudice after
they had been consolidated into this proceeding. Because the dismissals
without prejudice occurred after consolidation, they were not final orders as
-24-

to all claims and all parties and William Lowe and '\iiuusta Rose still had
theright,to pursue the motion to set aside the June 12, 2003, order in which
they had joined. ' I he trial coin t denied that motion in at i interlocutor) bend 1
tti'ili/i i in A| il " , "(III i, ,i I ui I i fi.nl i-l llii . appnJ

III

lismiss.Ns wilhoul

prej i idice. the enti ) of a I\ la^ r 1 2003, final order, and 'the entry of Default
Judgment on November 26, 2002, that is now ripe for reinstatement, on this
:tpi'-cai, all make up the fabric that is law ^Hh case. T aw of the case ^ of
particular importance in rruiei title at uwii^ such a,> die one that resulted in the
V c ember . . . - • - .

, **. .. . • .••.:. -

' .•

'. \ . •

interested in the property, the 3-month deadline undci LRCP 60(b) pla\ s a
very important role in setting a firm date after which ihc court that quieted
title through a Default Ju.dgm.ent will not disturb it, ' I ha t date came and...
went.here and is pail o! (lie lain K* oi the I.in i I llic viuv lluil should inn1 IK
taken inlii" .in mint fit ilHrrmininf, wliclhtT il v its rrfniir*m;; lu, ,w.'.^ ^r\ml%\

set the November 26, 2002, Default J udgment aside on June 12, 2003, or
w hether that, judgment should now be reinstated, a s discussed in Point Two.
The June 12, 2003, order was referred to in the prior appeal in a reply
brief and. in the decisioi I | n. 101, but * as not yet before thi;^,* ,
-25-
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Point Two - The Court of Appeals should reverse the June 12, 2003, sua
sponte order that erroneously set aside the November 26,2002, default
judgment and hold that the said November 26,2002, default judgment
stands as the Final Order in Civil Case No. 020908627 and that it is
"valid and conclusive" against KaLynn Ninow and against the estate.
Because the final, appealable order that was affirmed on appeal in
Ninow v, Lowe (Estate of Pahl) 2004 UT App 291, did not include as parties
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and 50% of its record shareholders and
their successors [KaLynn Ninow, as the personal representative, was record
legal shareholder of only 50% of its shares], Diamond Fork Land Company,
an equitable successor, filed two "independent action[s]" [See LfRCP 60(b)]:
[1] A shareholder derivative action to enforce the rights of Pahl's Salt Palace
Loan Office, Inc., against KaLynn Ninow; and, [2] A second such derivative
action to enforce the rights of Pahl's Land Partnership, by and through its
sole-surviving partner, Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., against Ryan
Pahl. It did so because the corporation's officers and directors, William
Lowe and Augusta Rose, had not been sued in their official representative
capacities and were also prevented by the threat of a preliminary injunction
from asserting the rights of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., beyond the
rejection of KaLynn Ninow's votes Mr. Lowe gave notice he had officially
performed on behalf of the said corporation as a corporate officer during the
-26-

interim period between the expiration of the TRO and the bench ruling
granting the preliminai ;j injunction [based on the i ight of Pahl's San ru.ace
I OilII I HVll'L'. Illl
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shareholder recor ds ] Fhe purpose of the two shareholder derhrative actions
was to, in the bi ight light of day, bring civil actions [of which the pei sonal
representative and the sole heir would both have actual notice as defendants]
to assert the rights ol Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc.,, to be adjudicated.
111 c s 11 * 11111 n i I i Iv 1 c 11 • 11 \ 11 (i s (," . 11" l i o n a >.» a n i s I 1 \ I s,, Ml i n :) .,- in t ol eel 3 000
sluiivs
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nidpinciil, Because

she did not join Pahl's Salt x « ^ ^ Loan Office, Inc., as a party, the "May"
and "December" agreements referred to in the prior appeal were never fully
adjudicated The judgment aifirmed on appeal was based on a si ipposedly
scrcndip... ,.

.-

i*e agieeineiiL * ,
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freed irom injunction bo llie^ would present its defense
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environment rather'than'this hair-trigger contempt environment, they, as the
officers, would have caused the corporation to make its slun
iniciil lis exposed in hv Ma)
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summary judgment motion in which they had no personal interest because
they claimed no shares. Surprisingly, Ms. Ninow did not timely respond to
the summons and then, after a Default Judgment was entered on November
26,2002, she failed to timely move for URCP 60(b) relief within 3 months.
Since this was a quiet title action involving 3000 shares of the 6000
shares that the probate court had ordered were owned by Gary Pahl at the
time of his death and were part of his estate [an order that was affirmed on
the prior appeal], she was the proper defendant in her capacity as personal
representative, because the informal probate remained open and the shares
remained subject to probate claims and administration. In entering the said
Default Judgment, the trial court ordered: "All of defendant's claims to
3000 shares (50%) of the stock of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., a
Utah corporation, are hereby extinguished and the legal and beneficial title
to the said 3000 shares is hereby quieted in favor of the plaintiffs successors
to those shares as set forth in the case record as follows: . . . ." [Emphasis
added.] The Utah Supreme Court held in 2003: "Section 78-40-13 of the
Utah Code governs default judgments in quiet title actions. It specifies that a
default 'judgment shall be conclusive against all the persons named in the
summons and complaint who have been served.' Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-28-

13 (2002) The statute's plain language clearly provides that if a person is
properly name*' -

»c summons and complaint and served, a defai ll t
. /_U
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a beneficial ow ner, and because the legal title was [at the same time that all
of the personal representative's claims were extinguished] quieted in favor
of out-of-state legal owners who were not parties to the case or to the T —
12, 21)03, oi der setting aside the November zo, zvuz, ueraun
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November 26, 2002, order was, from and after the date of entry of that o i _ ,
beyond, the in rem jurisdictional reach of the Utah courts. The out-of-state
owners in wn*,..

ai title was nun .*-u were not parties, so there was no
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was error, il had no iegal effect on lei'a1 \ •-?::. - * -
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was out-of-state beyond the court's jurisdiction and remains out-of-state.
The reversal of the June 12, 2003, order is sought because that order
was error and reversing n win eliminate an\ iw;.*;

>asis KaLynn N inow

might liiiw lnrlrviii|' (uMiiiiilM llu mil nl-slak1 invniTs parlies (o an action.

Lowe and Rose have no control over or contract with those owners.
But as long as those owners desire to have Lowe and Rose remain in
office as a quorum of directors, they can keep them there simply by making
sure that, as the owners of legal voting title to 50% of the shares, they never
appear at any shareholder meeting, thereby thwarting a shareholder quorum.
Lowe and Rose will continue to serve due to the lack of successors.
A court of competent jurisdiction might eventually be able to come in
and intervene, but no legal action has ever been brought or pled to do this.
After initially denying Ms. Ninow's URCP 60(b) motion for failing to
bring it within the required 3 months [Ms. Ninow was asserting all manner
of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, misconduct by her adversary,
fraud on the court, and the like, which are, of course, all subject to the three
month deadline in the rule], Judge Hilder, in a sua sponte order entered on
June 12, 2003, granted it. [Supp R.302] ["This court has this daty entered a
Ruling and Order in case No. 020908627 granting defendant's motion in that
case to set aside the default judgment."] It was clearly error to grant a 60(b)
motion not filed within 3 months of November 26,2002. The 2-1 decision
in Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46, 63 P.3rd
1008, provides no basis for disregarding the 3-month deadline. Unlike the
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"unique" facts in Oseguera, Ms. Ninow was not "affirmatively misled" hy
T

i1 c T-Tilder either about the entry of the Default J udgment or alnua iin -

of the entiy ( >f the Default Judgment. See Swart \ . State, 200 11 ) I App 209.
Appdhilr if\nsNiI ill (In1 hull I "', .MMM, ,mlrr sdliiifj aside (lit; I Vliiull
Judfjjiienl si i«i Hi ni lii I mm be ordered for the legal reasons the motion to set aside
the Default Judgment was opposed in 'the trial com ti [1] the trial court had
no jurisdiction to set the Default Judgment aside because Ms. Ninow did not
iile her motion within the required .* ihouuis. (~ i ^
tin cuuse l(»i (hi" Liitlini i. nil
nplaint*
merit

Ms. Ninow

•-•now never ottered
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to 'the claims for relief pled against her. Erickson v. S h ^ ^
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Forwarders, 882 P.2d 1147 (I Jtah 1994). [Cited and aruued to the trial court
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As in 'the case at bar, responsive papers filed by defendant in Erickson
• *l! - ared in the case file between the time the default dertificate was entered
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months. The 2-1 Oseguera decision by the Court of Appeals obviously did
not reverse the unanimous Erickson decision by the Utah Supreme Court.
Further, it was error to set aside the Default Judgment because Ms.
Ninow offered no excuse for her seriously tardy response to the summons
and complaint and, significantly, offered no defense of at least ostensible
merit. The sole defense raised in her responsive motion was that the rulings
and orders entered in the probate proceeding initiated by her May 29, 2002,
petition had preclusive effect upon the shareholder derivative action. This
defense had no ostensible merit at all because the August 26, 2002, summary
judgment ruling that later ripened into the May 1, 2003, order did not, on its
face, purport to grant share ownership that was free of all adverse claims and
liens, did not, on its face, purport to grant any legal voting rights as a record
shareholder, and, the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant any such relief
because the corporation was not joined as a party, not all legal successors to
its "shareholders of record" were joined as parties, and no formal published
notice was given under Titles 75 or 78 of the Utah Code under which those
non-parties were bound. When that defense was later litigated on the merits
it was rejected by Judge Medley, who ordered dismissal without prejudice
instead of with prejudice, rejecting the defense of preclusion on the merits.
-32-

Mi; *;t <-i-d hereto are copies of some of the filings in opposition to the
June 12. °0P^ order that were filed both before it was entered and after it
was entered sua sponte. [R.40J~
ii
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Judge Hilder's June 12, 2003, sua.sponte order. [R. 4053-4056] Reversal is
now sought on appeal ^

'ML i*• th.*i ^ixn,\ 'I * oi rectly orders that "as to

the first three subsection^

^ -r e limit is three

no discretion to extend that time." The trial com! should have stopped there
and simph KI Jed the motion to set aside the November 26, 2002, I )ef
• t - sit
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t 'til

icu. isi^tcau, the trial court concluded that Oseguera
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grounds that may be asserted under the first three subsections " The I••• • • I
court then tried to make the facts of this case fit into Oseuuera hs reasoning
that the entn of the Default Certificate "arose solely from court error." But
if even ; , -

* ourt erroi u> enter the default, that "court error" was fully

remediable under URCP 60(b)(1). See Erickson, supra. Further, had Ms.
Ninow timely responded to the summons, her default would not have been
sought or entered and it was clear error on this record to conclude that it was
entered "solely" due to such "court error" [if any]. The June 12, 2003, order
contains no finding or conclusion that Judge Hilder "affirmatively misled"
Ms. Ninow about the fact or date of entry of the November 26, 2002, Default
Judgment, as required under Oseguera and Swart, supra, which require that
a twice-tardy party such as Ms. Ninow [who blew both the 20-day summons
deadline and the 3-month 60(b) deadline] must actually be "affirmatively
misled" about the entry of the default judgment and/or date thereof. And it
must be the trial court that does the affirmative misleading. Here, the June
12, 2003, order concludes only that the 3-month deadline under URCP 60(b)
"was missed by a relatively short time, and to some extent this was because
plaintiff did not give prompt notice of the judgment." In fact, the Notice of
Judgment [R.3898] was served by mail on December 17, 2002, and gave
notice that the Default Judgment had been "entered herein on November 26,
2002" and an actual signed copy of the Default Judgment was appended to
that Notice of Judgment. [R. 3899] Ms. Ninow then had over two months to
comply with the 3-month deadline. Nothing in the June 12, 2003, order or in
-34-

the record as supplemented contends Ms. Ninow's counsel did not receive
the Notice of Judgment. This court should not consider such a contention if
it is raised on appeal. Swart v. State, supra, citing Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v.
11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) [*5] (stating appellate
courts will not consider an issue that is raised for the first time on appeal).
The June 12, 2003, order claims that the trial court had authority to
"reconsider" the law of the case created by its initial denial of the URCP
60(b) motion on May 2, 2003, as time-barred under "Thurston v. Box Elder
County and Trembley v. Mrs. Fields Cookies" because "no final judgment
has entered based on the court's bench ruling of May 2, 2003." [R.4053]
The trial court's analysis is incorrect. The final order is the November
26, 2002, Default Judgment. The May 2, 2003, ruling denied a motion to set
that final order aside. The June 12, 2003, order states the trial court is "still
persuaded" that said May 2, 2003, ruling was correct as to "motions under
60(b)(6) that could be brought pursuant to one of the first three subsections"
and Ms. Ninow's motion could be brought pursuant to URCP 60(b)(1), (2),
or (3). The trial court's "critical point" that the "defendant had not 'failed to
plead or otherwise defend' [Rule 55(a)], at the time default was sought" and
that therefore the clerk "was not empowered to enter the default" [R.4054]
-35-

cannot be sustained on appeal. The sua sponte finding that the default was
sought after Ms. Ninow had filed her responsive motion was made without
giving the parties notice that the trial court thought this was a "critical point"
and without taking evidence or holding a hearing. In light of the lack of any
evidence or hearing, there is no evidence that can be marshaled in support of
the trial court's "critical point." The only evidence on the "critical point" is
the Affidavit of Robert Henry Copier [R.4059] which establishes that default
was not sought after defendant had filed her responsive motion, but that the
application and motion for entry of default in the form of a proposed Default
Judgment was actually submitted to the downstairs civil clerks at the Scott
M. Matheson courthouse "several days before the clerk entered the default
certificate on November 25, 2002." Since Ms. Ninow's responsive motion
was belatedly filed on November 25, 2002, two-and-a-half weeks after the
November 8, 2002, deadline for filing it, the default "was sought" several
days before she filed her responsive motion, not "after" she had filed it. And
the conclusion by the trial court that this was a "critical point" is error. The
"critical" [and jurisdictional] "point" is that Ms. Ninow failed to file under
URCP 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) within 3 months and a "court error" [if there was
one] constituted a 60(b)(1) court "mistake" subject to the 3-month deadline.
-36-

In the moving papers in which appellants joined after involuntarily
becoming parties through case consolidation, it was argued that because the
June 12, 2003, order set aside a default judgment that had extinguished legal
title of defendant and quieted it in favor of out-of-state non-parties, it may be
of some interest to national title insurers who rely on that 3-month deadline.
If this court has any inclination towards affirming the June 12, 2003,
order, then some amicus briefing should be invited by this court from some
representative sample of large national title insurers who may be impacted
by such an appellate decision. Because title insurance profit margins are so
bloated because the statutory franchises under which title insurers operate
disconnect their fees from the underlying actuarial risk, they may see such
an appellate decision as an aberration in Utah about which they care little.
But they ought to at least be given that opportunity [in the event this
court believes there is legal basis for sustaining the June 12, 2003, order].
Point Three - All rulings and orders entered by the trial court
between the signing of the April 26,2005, Ruling and Order and the
filing of the Notice of Appeal on September 15,2005, should be reversed
as erroneous except for matters in the Final Order signed on August 16,
2005, that are not being challenged on appeal. The trial court should be
ordered to entertain no matters as to which the April 26,2005, order isf
law of the case and ordered to entertain only matters remanded in the
decision on this appeal or reserved in the August 16,2005, order. The
removal of appellants as officers/directors of PahPs Salt Palace Loan
Office, Inc., via the August 16,2005, Final Order should be reversed.
-37-

Point One above demonstrates that this appeal can be decided in the
appellants' favor by applying law of the case. Point Two above shows that
the June 12, 2003, order [which was referred to in the prior appeal at n.10 as
not yet before the court, but now is] was erroneous because the November
26, 2002, Default Judgment did not constitute a court error and even if it did
it was a "mistake" that had to be timely remedied under 60(b)(1), (2), or (3).
This gets us to the orders erroneously entered by the trial court after
the reversal and remand in the prior appeal. Because, in her filings in May
of 2002, Ms. Ninow had alleged all manner of forgery, embezzlement, and
malfeasance in the operation of PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., none of
which that was then ever made part of the final order, and because Mr. Lowe
and Ms. Rose were not proper parties to the motion for summary judgment
because they personally claimed no ownership of any shares adverse to Ms.
Ninow's claims, one of their primary objectives was to put up mere token
resistance so as to get the final, appealable order as soon as possible and to
have this court decide on the appeal of that final, appealable order that it
was, indeed, an appeal from a final, appealable order and that there were no
real estate issues reserved in the trial court. The issue of whether or not Mr,
Lowe and Ms. Rose had succeeded in securing the May 1, 2003, order as the
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final order on all the claims pled in the May 29, 2002, petition, and not just
the share ownership claims, was duly framed by Presiding Judge Norman H.
Jackson in the Order of October 28, 2003, in the prior appeal. ["Appellee
also contends that the first notice of appeal was not filed from a final,
appealable order because the district court has not ruled on the ownership of
real property;9 "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition to briefing the
merits, the parties shall also brief the issue of whether the appeal is taken
from a final, appealable order.99] Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose prevailed on this
point in the prior appeal decision. "As an initial matter, we have determined
that Respondents' appeal is taken from a final, appealable order.99 Ninow v.
Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291.1 Accordingly, after the prior

1

If the Court of Appeals had decided otherwise and had held that there were
still real property issues pending before the trial court, Mr. Lowe would have
personally litigated them after the remand. Mr. Lowe has been candid about
the fact that PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., in 2000, contracted to pay
his attorney fees incurred in his dealings with KaLynn Ninow and pledged
the real and personal property that it controlled to secure that contract, and
any order on the merits of any real estate claims would have had to consider
that claim. As it stands, while Ms. Ninow, in May of 2005, persuaded Judge
Lewis that there were still real property issues pending in the trial court, no
final order deciding the merits any real estate claims was ever entered below.
Ms. Ninow9s argument that such claims remained pending is contradicted by
Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291; by an order duly signed
April 26, 2005, which disposed of everything that had been pending; by Ms.
Ninow9s filing dated July 8, 2005 [R.3080] asserting that only contempt of
court issues remained; and by the Final Order signed on August 16, 2005,
based on that July 8th filing. No real estate issues have survived those orders.
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appeal was decided, the only matters before the trial court were [1] matters
that had been remanded; [2] the two civil cases that had been consolidated
during the appeal; and, [3] the contempt motions that Ms. Ninow had begun
to file as a serial filer of contempt motions. After the interlocutory bench
order on April 6, 2005, and the Ruling and Order signed April 26, 2005,
everything done after April 26, 2005, through the filing of the Notice of
Appeal on September 15, 2005, should be reversed, except for the matters in
the order signed on August 16, 2005, that are not being challenged on appeal
by the appellants. Since all the matters that had either been remanded or
consolidated had been disposed of by the close of the trial court's bench
order of April 6, 2005, the only matter remaining for decision after April 6,
2005, was alleged contempt, which was disposed of in the Ruling and Order
of April 26, 2005. Since no one was found to be in contempt, there was no
basis for entering any orders. And even if someone had been found to be in
contempt, there was no basis for entering any orders going to "the merits."
Because the trial judge in this case who erroneously entered orders on
"the merits" from April 26, 2005, through September 15, 2005, even though
the only matters pending were contempt matters, [Hon. Leslie A. Lewis], is
the same judge who was later reversed on appeal in another case for doing
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the same thing in that case [Homever (In Re Cannatella) v. Stage Associates,
2006 UT App. 89; 132 P.2d 284], perhaps Judge Lewis simply made an
overly optimistic appraisal of the scope of her own contempt powers and the
correction that this court made in that case should also be made in this case.
If this court, on that basis, reverses everything done between April 26,
2005, and August 16, 2005; the portion of the order signed August 16, 2005,
that is being challenged; and everything done after signing of that Final
Order through the filing of the Notice of Appeal on September 15, 2005, this
court may not need to reach the substantive errors in the interlocutory orders
and in the challenged portion of the Final Order signed August 16, 2005. It
is sufficient to note here that these orders that went beyond the scope of the
contempt matter were also erroneous on the legal merits in important ways.
2

The errors, include, inter alia: [1] disregarding appellate law of the case by
ordering in May of 2005 that a preliminary injunction that had expired under
its own terms on August 26, 2002, when the trial court had granted summary
judgment on the merits had never "actually" expired because real property
issues were "actually" still pending even though that issue had been framed
by Judge Jackson in an order and rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals in
its decision. [Even Emperor Caligula, who famously wrote his decrees in
small letters and posted them on high pillars to ensnare the Roman people,
understood.he could not retroactively extend an expired injunction in that
unfair fashion.]; and, [2] ordering in May of 2005 that the May 1, 2003,
summary judgment affirmed on appeal precluded non-parties from asserting
adverse claims even though this was contrary to law of the case created by
Judge Medley when he dismissed claims without prejudice instead of with
prejudice. No conclusions were entered justifying revisiting law of the case.
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Since no URCP 60(b) motion was ever filed by Ms. Ninow within 3
months of August 19, 2005, and since she did not cross-appeal herein, the
trial court's order [R.2609] signed on April 26, 2005, and filed on April 28,
2005, will now fully stand as the law of the case. The reasoning therein
regarding lack any contempt is sound. Undeterred, Ms. Ninow has now
continued to try to have counsel, parties, and even a non-party held in
"contempt" for the arguments that they have made and the positions that
they have asserted in litigation. Thankfully, no one has, at least so far, been
held in contempt of court for making legal arguments and taking litigation
positions, as such matters are shielded by a broad judicial privilege. The
trial court still has pending before it contempt motions that Ms. Ninow has
continued to file as a serial filer of contempt motions, but, very sensibly, has
deferred them until this appeal is decided. The April 26, 2005, order is not
challenged on appeal. It pertains to contempt and this court should order the
trial court to entertain no contempt matters based on substantially the same
facts. These appellants understand that this court has jurisdiction only over
orders entered through September 15, 2005. The requested appellate order
would instruct the trial court as to the application of April 26, 2005, law of
the case. The appellate order is requested to end serial contempt motions.
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The law of the case created by Judge Medley's dismissals of claims
adverse to the May 1, 2003, summary judgment order without prejudice
instead of with prejudice will also stand both because it is not being
challenged on appeal and because it is sound. While that May 1, 2003,
summary judgment [that was affirmed on appeal in Ninow v. Lowe II
addressed only share ownership, it was supported by a rather lengthy
recitation of numbered facts. Some of those facts were ultimate facts, some
of them were subsidiary facts, and some of them were gratuitous facts that
were not material to the order of summary judgment. Under URCP 7 and
56, the facts that support a summary judgment are not deemed undisputed
for purposes of any other order. To the extent that the facts are ultimate
facts or subsidiary facts, they support the summary judgment. To the extent
they are neither ultimate nor subsidiary facts, they serve no purpose, because
they do not support the summary judgment and cannot be used to support
any order other than the summary judgment. In Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005
UT 22; 112 P.3d 495, Justice Parrish wrote that not all facts are created
equal: some are ultimate facts, upon which the resolution of a particular
issue turns, while others are subsidiary facts supporting the ultimate facts.
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The undisputed summary judgment facts in the first appeal included a
large number of facts that were neither ultimate nor subsidiary facts, but that
were "gratuitous" because they served no purpose as either ultimate facts or
subsidiary facts. One of those was a finding that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose
had been removed and replaced as officers and directors by KaLynn Ninow,
Richard Ninow, and Ryan Pahl. That finding was not material to summary
judgment, which dealt only with share ownership. It was neither an ultimate
fact nor a subsidiary fact that supported the summary judgment. Instead, it
was merely a "gratuitous" fact that served no purpose as to the May 1, 2003,
summary judgment and could not be used to support any order[s] other than
that May 1, 2003, final order. For this reason, Judge Medley declined to
give that finding any preclusive effect over non-parties when he dismissed
the shareholder derivative actions of Diamond Fork Land Company [which
was not a party to the May 1, 2003, summary judgment] without prejudice.
That law of the case [Supp R. 376; Supp R. 385] stands both because
it is correct and because Ms. Ninow has not challenged it by filing a motion
under URCP 60(b) within 3 months of August 19, 2005, or by filing a crossappeal. Judge Medley was right on this issue and Judge Lewis was wrong.
And Judge Medley's law of the case will now stand as unchallenged.
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Further, since Judge Medley was the judge who entered both the May
1, 2003, summary judgment as to share ownership [R.1114] affirmed in the
prior appeal [Ninow v. Lowe Estate of Pahl, 2004 UT App. 291] and the two
orders of dismissal "without prejudice" [Supp R. 376; Supp R. 385] creating
law of the case that the May 1, 2003, order has no preclusive effect over any
adverse share claimants not a party to the order and no preclusive effect over
the corporation itself, he was the judicial officer best positioned to make that
call. Nothing in his prior orders or in the decision on appeal is contrary to it.
Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose have not claimed any personal ownership of
shares of stock that is contrary to the May 1, 2003, summary judgment and
have not, therefore, ever been in contempt of court to the extent the May 1,
2003, order imposed some "duty" that they disobeyed [which is doubtful].
After the November 26, 2002, judgment declaring legal rights of Mr.
Lowe and Ms. Rose as a quorum of directors was set aside on June 12, 2003,
Diamond Fork Land Company moved to dismiss, since it had transferred its
claims. Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose have been consistent in asserting a legal
right to serve as directors and officers until their successors are qualified, a
posture that is consistent with the orders of dismissal "without prejudice"
[Supp R. 376; Supp R. 385] and resulting law of the case thereby created.
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In arguing for dismissal with prejudice, Ms. Ninow referred to the
findings and orders in the probate proceeding and argued that they were
binding on Diamond Fork Land Company and its successors, that William
Lowe and Augusta Rose had been removed as directors by those findings
and/or orders, that KaLynn Ninow, Richard Ninow, and Ryan Pahl had been
installed in their place, and that the dismissal should therefore be made with
prejudice. Judge Medley dismissed without prejudice and there has been no
showing that this law of the case should now be disturbed, nor was there a
timely cross-appeal or timely URCP 60(b) motion filed within 3 months of
August 19, 2005 under which that law of the case may now be challenged.
UCA Sec. 75-3-106 provides:
"Scope of proceedings — Proceedings independent — Exception" provides
that "(1) Unless supervised administration as described in Part 5 of this
chapter is involved: (a) Each proceeding before the court or registrar is
independent of any other proceeding involving the same estate, (b) Petitions
for formal orders of the court may combine various requests for relief in a
single proceeding if the orders sought may be finally granted without delay."
In dismissing Diamond Fork Land Company's suits "without
prejudice," Judge Medley was ruling in a manner consistent with this
provision. His May 1, 2003, summary judgment was a final, appealable
order that concluded the entire proceeding commenced on May 29, 2002.
Since it did not bind non-parties, it had no preclusive effect on them.
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A trial court is never free to enter orders that are contrary to law or to
appellate law of the case. A trial court is also not free to disregard trial court
law of the case unless the court enters conclusions that allow the trial court
law of the case to be revisited under Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d
1034 (Utah 1995), and/or Trembley v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.3d 1306
(Utah App. 1994). No such conclusions were entered here, and, since there
was no timely URCP 60(b) motion filed after August 19, 2005, and there
was no cross-appeal, the law of the case duly made by Judge Medley in his
interlocutory dismissals without prejudice and by Judge Lewis in those parts
of the order signed on August 16, 2005, that are not being challenged, stand*
Ms. Ninow's pursuit of her serial contempt motions after the April 26,
2005, Ruling and Order, and the erroneous interlocutory rulings and orders
that arose from that pursuit, were contrary to law, contrary to appellate law
of the case, contrary to the trial court law of the case, and contrary to the
holding in Homeyer (In Re Cannatella) v. Stage Associates, 2006 UT App.
89; 132 P.2d 284, that clearly prohibits orders on the "merits" in a contempt
matter. Ms. Ninow's pursuit of post-April 26, 2005, orders made her one of
the "indefatigable diehards" referred to in Thurston, As requested in Point
Four, ordering a hearing on the $20,000 undertaking may help to stop this.
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Point Four - A hearing on the TRO undertaking should be ordered.
Judge Lewis was without discretion to deny the request for a hearing,
since the language in URCP 65A(c)(3) is mandatory. Denying the motion
for a hearing on April 6, 2005, was an error now ripe for appellate reversal.
When Ms. Ninow initiated this dispute on May 20, 2002, by appearing
ex parte before Hon. Sandra Peuler with the corporation's shareholder list,
claiming the list was wrong, that provided no basis for issuing a TRO. A
corporation's shareholder list establishes shareholders of record entitled to
vote until a court in an action to which the corporation is a parity changes it.
Because the official list had never been ordered changed by a court of
competent jurisdiction, Ms. Ninow's attempts to unilaterally form a quorum
to vote out the directors and install new ones was a legal nullity of no effect.
The ground for the ex parte TRO was Ms. Ninow's assertion that the
directors were engaged in all manner of forgery, embezzlement, misconduct,
and destruction of records, and that an ex parte TRO without notice was thus
needed. Judge Peuler could have bound both sides with a TRO, ordered the
premises padlocked by a constable, and appointed a receiver and/or special
master to sort this out. Or she could do what she did, i.e., order a $20,000
undertaking. The ex parte allegations were never established on the merits.
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Since Mr. Lowe was wrongfully restrained [both because the basis for
the TRO was never embodied in an order on the merits and because the prior
appeal included a reversal that scaled-back (to its original 11:00 a.m., May
30, 2002, time and date of expiration) a TRO that had been wrongfully and
retroactively extended by the trial court so as to "wrongfully restrain" Mr.
Lowe under the TRO during the noon recess on May 30, 2002], Ms. Ninow
and her husband Richard Ninow, who posted the $20,000 undertaking, have
no good faith objection at law to having Mr. Ninow now pay the $20,000.
Mr. Lowe promptly moved for a hearing on that undertaking shortly
after the prior reversal and remand. That motion was denied on April 6,
2005, in an interlocutory bench order and is now part of the pending appeal.
Once Mr. Lowe gave Ms. Ninow actual notice that he had utilized the
short period between expiration of the TRO at 11:00 a.m. on May 30, 2002,
and the announcement of the preliminary injunction to reject, on behalf of
the corporation, for want of a quorum of record shareholders, her unilateral
attempt to vote him and the other two directors out and to replace them, she
should have brought an action under UCA Sec. 16-10a-809, "Removal of
directors by judicial proceeding." She would have the standing to do this
because she controlled at least 10% of the outstanding shares of Pahl's Salt
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Palace Loan Office, Inc., and she was alleging that "(a) the directors
engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct or gross abuse of authority or
discretion with respect to the corporation; and (b) removal is in the best
interest of the corporation." She would have been required to "make the
corporation a party defendant." She did none of these things. Trying not to
state the obvious, a Utah statutory mandate to make "the corporation a party
defendant" cannot be satisfied by, instead, restraining and enjoining all the
corporation's officers so they are unable to mount its defense or pursue its
claims. So utilizing a TRO and preliminary injunction is the polar opposite
of making the corporation a party defendant. The TRO allegations were
never established on the merits and Mr. Lowe is now entitled to a hearing.
CONCLUSION
This court should reverse the June 12, 2003, order, reverse the April 6,
2005, order denying the motion for a hearing on the TRO undertaking, and
reverse those portions of post-AQ^PRk2005, orders challenged on appeal,
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ADDENDUM
1. Determinative statutes and rules.
2. May 1,2003, final order affirmed in the prior appeal. [R. 1114]
3. October 28,2003, order in the prior appeal.
4.

September 2,2004, decision in the prior appeal.

5. November 26,2002, default judgment. [R.3899]
6. December 16, 2002, notice of judgment. [R.3898]
7. March 24, 2003, opposition to motion to set aside. [R. 4032]
8. June 12,2003, order granting motion to set aside. [R. 4053]
9. July 2, 2003, motion to vacate June 12, 2003, order. [R. 4057]
10. July 2,2003, affidavit in support of motion to vacate. [R. 4059]
11. July 2, 2003, memorandum in support of motion. [R. 4061]
Attachments to memorandum:
A. August 14, 2002, response to document request [R. 4071]
B. June 30,2003, letter. [R 4073]
C. May 1, 2003, minute entry. [R. 4074]
12. April 6, 2005, probate minutes. [R 2555]
13. April 26, 2005, ruling and order filed April 28, 2005. [R. 2609]
14. July 8, 2005, memorandum filed July 14,2005 [R. 3080]
15. July 15, 2005, reply memorandum filed July 18,2005 [R. 3091]
Attachment to reply memorandum:
A. Letter dated July 15,2005. [R. 3097]
16. August 16, 2005,finalorder filed August 19, 2005. [R. 3200]
17. September 10,2005, withdrawal of motions as moot. [R. 3286]
18. September 15,2005, notice of appeal. [R. 3303]

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
UCA Sec. 16-10a-809. Removal of directors by judicial proceeding.
(1) The district court of the county in this state where a corporation's
principal office or, if it has no principal office in this state, its registered
office is located may remove a director in a proceeding commenced either
by the corporation or by its shareholders holding at least 10% of the
outstanding shares of any class if the court finds that:
(a) the director engaged infraudulentor dishonest conduct or gross abuse
of authority or discretion with respect to the corporation; and
(b) removal is in the best interest of the corporation.
(2) The court that removes a director may bar the director from reelection
for a period prescribed by the court.
(3) If shareholders commence a proceeding under Subsection (1), they
shall make the corporation a party defendant.
(4) A director who is removed pursuant to this section may deliver to the
division for filing a statement to that effect pursuant to Section 16-10a-1608.
UCA Sec. 75-3-106. Scope of proceedings ~ Proceedings
independent — Exception.
(1) Unless supervised administration as described in Part 5 of this
chapter is involved:
(a) Each proceeding before the court or registrar is independent of any
other proceeding involving the same estate.
(b) Petitions for formal orders of the court may combine various
requests for relief in a single proceeding if the orders sought may be
finally granted without delay. Except as required for proceedings which
are particularly described by other sections of this chapter, no petition is
defective because it fails to embrace all matters which might then be the
subject of a final order.
(c) Proceedings for probate of wills or adjudications of no will
may be combined with proceedings for appointment of personal
representatives.
(d) A proceeding for appointment of a personal representative is
concluded by an order making or declining the appointment.
URAP 4(d). Additional or cross-appeal.
If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a
notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of

appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraphs
(a) and (b) of this rule, whichever period last expires,
URCP 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while
the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate
court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative
from afinaljudgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1),
(2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b)
does not affect thefinalityof a judgment or suspend its operation. This
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
GARY G. PAHL

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Deceased.

Civil No. 003901101
Judge Medley

This matter came before the Court at a hearing on August 26,2002 based on the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by KaLynn Ninow, in her capacity as the personal representative of
the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, and in her capacity as the court appointed Guardian and Conservator
for Ryan B. Pahl, the only heir (devisee) of Gary G. Pahl. Also, the court considered the motions
for competing motions for summary judgment filed by Mr. Copier on behalf of his clients.
Appearing at the hearing was KaLynn Ninow, represented by and through counsel, Van
Woerkom & Condie, LC, William T. Lowe, represented by and through counsel, Robert Copier,
who appeared on behalf of his clients. The Court, having heard theL&rguments of counsel and
1

//

being otherwise fully and sufficiently advised, and having entered its FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Personal Representative of the Estate of

Gary Pahl is GRANTED.
2.

Gary Pahl was the owner of all 6,000 shares of stock of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office,

Inc., at the time of his death, and all of said 6,000 shares are part of the property belonging to the
Estate of Gary Pahl, and to Ryan Pahl as the only devisee of the Estate.
DATED, this the _ / _ day of _ / VUUA/, 2003.
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ORDER
Case No. 20030169-CA

Kaylinn Ninow,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
Grand Staircase Land Co., a Utah
corporation, William Lowe,
Augusta Rose, and Robert
Mortensen,
Respondents and Appellants.

Augusta Rose,
Third-Party Petitioner,
v.
Ryan Pahl, Kaylinn Ninow,
Richard Ninow, and Does I-V,
Third-Party Respondents.

Before Judges Jackson, bench, and Orme.
This matter is before the court on Appelleexs Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, Motion for Summary Disposition, Motion to Dismiss
Unframed Issues and Improper Parties, and Appellants'1
suggestions of mootness and request to defer decision on
Appellee's motions.2
1. Robert Mortensen was dismissed from the probate proceedings
and is not a party to this appeal.
2,

Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, seeking
(continued...)

Appellee contends that
a final order and Appellant
order. However, consistent
contempt order in this case
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1167

the October 1, 2002 contempt order is
Lowe did not timely appeal from that
with the general rule, the civil
is interlocutory. See Von Hake v.
& n.3 (Utah 1988).

Appellee also contends that the first notice of appeal was
not filed from a final, appealable order because the district
court has not ruled on the ownership"of the real property.
Appellants have filed suggestions of partial mootness but
have not moved to dismiss any part of their appeal. Rather, they
request this court to defer decision on Appellee's motions
pending resolution of a motion to set aside a default ^udoment in
a collateral action.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants' request to defer
decision is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellee's motion to dismiss
Appellants' appeal, including Appellant Lowe's appeal of the
interlocutory contempt order, is denied, and a ruling as to
whether Appellants' appeal is taken from a final, appealable
order is deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration
of the appeal.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition to briefing the
merits, the parties shall also brief the issue of whether the
appeal is taken from a final, appealable order. See In re Estate
of Vorhees, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977, 980 (1961).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellee's Motion to Dismiss
Unframed Issues and Improper Parties is denied.
The parties will be notified when a briefing schedule has
been established.
Dated this ^p/t>

day of October 2003

FOR THE COURT:

Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge

2•
(•..continued)
summary reversal. However, Appellants have withdrawn the motion.
2
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In the matter of the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, deceased.

KaLynn Ninow,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
William Lowe; Augusta Rose; Robert Mortensen; and Grand Staircase
Land Co., a Utah corporation,
Respondents and Appellants.

Augusta Rose,
Third-party Petitioner,
v.
KaLynn Ninow, Ryan Pahl, Richard Ninow, and Does I-V,
Third-party Respondents.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20030169-CA

F I L E D
(September 2, 2004)
2004 UT App 291

Third District, Salt Lake Department

http://www.utcourts,gov/opinions/mds/ninow090204.htm

4/25/2006

The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
Attorneys: Robert H. Copier, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Daniel F. Van Woerkom and Sandra K. Weeks, Lehi, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Thorne.
DAVIS, Judge:
William Lowe and Augusta Rose (collectively, Respondents) appeal
the trial court's October 1, 2002 order determining that Lowe was in
contempt of court and the trial court's May 1, 2003 order granting
summary judgment in favor of KaLynn Ninow. We affirm in part, and
reverse and remand in part.
As an initial matter, we have determined that Respondents' appeal
is taken from a final, appealabl€> order. See In re Estate of
Voorhees, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977, 980 (1961).
Respondents argue that the trial court erred in its October 1,
2002 order by determining that Lowe was in contempt of court.
Pursuant to rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, once a
temporary restraining order (TRO) is granted, it
shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not
to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, unless within the
time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended
for a like period or unless the party against whom the order
is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer
period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of
record.
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(b)(2).
The terms of the TRO in this case provided for the preliminary
injunction hearing to be held at 10:00 a.m. on May 30, 2002, and for
the TRO to expire at 11:00 a.m. on the same day. The parties did not
stipulate to an extension of the TRO; Ninow did not request that the
trial court extend the TRO for "good cause"; and, contrary to Ninow 1 s
argument, commencement of the preliminary injunction hearing one hour
prior to the expiration of the TRO did not operate as a "good cause"
extension of the TRO. Id. As such, under the plain language of rule
65A(b)(2), the TRO expired at 11:00 a.m. on May 30, 2002. Therefore,
Lowe's actions during the noon recess of the preliminary injunction
hearing were not in violation of the TRO.-^-
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Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's determination that Lowe
was in contempt of court for violating the TRO. With respect to the
relief granted by the trial court in its October 1, 2002 order, we
reverse only Ninow's attorney fee award.XAJ- We remand and instruct the
trial court to order the return to Lowe of all amounts paid for
Ninow's attorney fees awarded in connection with the trial court's
contempt determination.-^Respondents also argue that the trial court erred in its May 1,
2 003 summary judgment order by determining that Gary G. Pahl (Gary)
owned all 6000 shares of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. (the
Corporation) at the time of his death. More specifically, Respondents
assert that the trial court erred by determining that, at the time of
his death, Gary owned 3000 shares of the Corporation (the 3000
shares) that were previously owned by Frank H. Pahl (Frank) .-^-- Based
upon this alleged error, Respondents argue that it was error for the
trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Ninow.
Pursuant to rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56 also provides that
[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in [rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
The 3 000 shares were the subject matter of two transfer
agreements contained in the record before u s . — In the first
agreement, dated May 6, 1998 (the May agreement) ,-^- Frank agreed to
(7)

transfer the 3 000 shares to Gary.-— In the second agreement, dated
December 28, 1998 (the December agreement),-^- the Corporation agreed
to purchase the 3000 shares from Gary, so that the Corporation could
hold them as treasury stock. In the statement of undisputed facts
contained in Ninow's memorandum in support of her motion for summary
judgment, she asserted that (1) the May agreement was completed and
"paid in full," and (2) the Corporation did not make the required
payments to Gary under the December agreement. Ninow supported these
facts with citations to affidavits and exhibits contained in the
trial record. Respondents did not specifically dispute these facts
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either in their memorandum in opposition to Ninow's motion for
summary judgment, or by way of the affidavits and exhibits cited
therein. Because Respondents failed to "set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," the trial court was
required to accept these facts as undisputed.-^- Utah R. Civ. P. 56
(e); see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because these undisputed facts,
together with the plain language of both the May agreement and the
December agreement, are determinative of Gary's. ownership of the 3000
shares at the time of his death, summary judgment in favor of Ninow
was appropriate. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court did not err by determining that Gary
owned all 6000 shares of the Corporation at the time of his death,
and we affirm the trial court's May 1, 2003 order granting summary
judgment in favor of Ninow.—-—

James Z. Davis, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
1. We disagree with Ninow's assertion that our holding on this issue
will "invite judicial chaos." If a party wishes to have a TRO
extended beyond its original terms, that party can simply seek the
opposing party's consent to an extension, or request an extension
from the trial court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(b)(2). Ninow could have
pursued either of these alternatives prior to or at the outset of the
preliminary injunction hearing, but chose not to. Even if Ninow had
been unable to secure consent to an extension from Respondents, it is
unlikely the trial court would have denied a request to extend the
TRO until completion of the preliminary injunction heairing.
2. Based upon our resolution of Respondents' next argument, we affirm
the trial court's determinations that Lowe was not entitled to the
$7500 he obtained during the noon recess of the preliminary
injunction hearing and that he was required to return those funds to
Ninow.
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3. Respondents argue that Lowe is also entitled to his reasonable
attorney fees in opposing the contempt motion both in the trial court
and on appeal. However, none of the legal authorities that
Respondents have cited in support of this argument authorize an award
of attorney fees to a party opposing a contempt motion. Therefore, we
conclude that this argument is inadequately briefed and we do not
address it further. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9); State v. Thomas,
961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998).
4. Respondents do not dispute that, at the time of his death, Gary
owned the other 3 0 00 shares of the Corporation.
5. Neither party asserts that these were not legal, binding
agreements.
6. The trial court determined, and we agree, that the May agreement
is "not ambiguous, and can therefore be interpreted as a matter of
law. »
7. Respondents assert that the May agreement somehow "conveyed" the
3000 shares to Lowe. However, this assertion is contrary to the plain
language of the May agreement. The May agreement provided that Lowe
was merely "holding" the 3000 shares until the May agreement was
"fulfilled in whole." The May agreement also provided that it was
"[Frank's] desire to sell [the 3000 shares] to Gary," and that upon
"successful completion" of the May agreement, the 3000 shares would
"belong to Gary." Accordingly, under the plain language of the May
agreement, the trial court correctly determined that "Lowe had no
power or authority to retain the [3 0 00 shares] in any way once the
[May agreement] had been completed."
8. The trial court determined, and we agree, that the December
agreement is "unambiguous and may be interpreted as a matter of law."
9. Based upon these undisputed facts, the trial court correctly
determined that (1) " [a]s soon as the payments had been made under
the [May agreement], the ownership of the [3000 shares] vested in
Gary"; and (2) because "[p]ayment was not made according to the terms
of the [December agreement]," it "was never successfully completed
and the [3 000 shares] could not have become treasury stock, either
prior to, or following [Gary's] death."
10. In their reply brief, Respondents ask this court to reverse a
June 12, 2003 order entered in a separate civil case against Ninow.
We do not address this argument for several obvious reasons. First,
although the separate civil case against Ninow may have been combined
with this case, that did not occur until nearly one year after
Respondents filed their notice of appeal in this case; therefore, any
proceedings in the separate civil case against Ninow are not part of
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Respondents' appeal in this case. Also, the June 12, 2003 order was
not entered until after Respondents1 notice of appeal was filed in
this case. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (stating that "the notice of
appeal . . . shall be filed . . . within [thirty] days after the date
of entry of the judgment or order appealed from" (emphasis added)).
Finally, Respondents raised this argument for the first time in their
reply brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(c); Hart v. Salt Lake County
Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 139 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (»[B]ecause this
argument was raised for the first time in [the] reply brief, we
decline to address it. 11 ).
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Third Judicial D'stnct

Attorney for Relator
200 Metro Place
243 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803
Telephone 531-7923

- IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation,
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs
KALYNN NTNOW, personal
representative of the estate of
Gary G. Pahl, deceased,

Civil No. 020908627
Judge Bruce C Lubeck

Defendant.
Defendant's default having been entered, the court now grants default
judgment, and hereby, ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES, as follows.

I
I

1. All of defendant's claims to 3000 shares (50%) of the stock of Pahl's
Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., a Utah corporation, are hereby extinguished and the
legal and beneficial title to the said 3000 shares is hereby quieted in favor of the

!

plaintiffs successors to those shares as set forth in the case record, as follows:

i

Bangkok Birth Mothers Basic Education Trust 1500 shares (25%)
(With Bangkok Birth Mothers Trust for
Equity and Justice as the beneficial owner)

\
|
j

Bangkok Birth Mothers Advocacy Trust
1500 shares
(With Diamond Fork Land Company, a
Utah corporation, as the beneficial owner)

'

(25%)

\
i

i

!
i

2 No other or further writ or order shall be required and this default
judgment fully adjudicates any claims between the parties as to the 3000 shares
and fully and finally quiets the ownership of the 3000 shares as set forth above.
3. In the event that plaintiff or any of plaintiff s successors to the 3000
shares shall deem it necessary to have defendant reasonably execute papers or
documents to vindicate and protect the rights of plaintiffs successors to the 3000
shares, defendant is hereby ORDERED to sign all such papers and documents.
4. As to the second claim for relief in the First Amended Complaint, it is
hereby decreed that any and all acts, filings, and transactions purporledly made or
entered into by or on behalf of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., after the death
of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this judgment, as well as any actions that were
purportedly made or entered into by unanimous action of shareholders or by a
quorum of shareholders after the death of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this
judgment, which have not been expressly approved or ratified by a board of
directors upon which Augusta Rose and William Lowe served as directors, are
declared and decreed to be unauthorized, of no force or effect, and voidab initio.
5. It is further decreed that no action, filing, or transaction purportedly
made or entered into by or on behalf of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., from
and after the date of this judgment shall have any force or effect unless approved
or ratified by a board of directors upon which William Lowe and Augusta Rose
serve as directors, until such time as their successors, if any, are duly qualified.
6. The third claim for relief is dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
DATED THIS J ^ ^ D A Y OF N O V E M B p ^ © ^ ^
BY THE (&XJ&S&®Mmt7\

,
!

ruumiey ror Keiator
200 Metro Place
243 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803
Telephone 531-7923
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN
OFFICE, INC, a Utah corporation,
ex rel DIAMOND FORK LAND
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs
Civil No 020908627
Judge Robert Hilder

KALYNN NINOW, personal
representative of the estate of
Gary G Pahl, deceased,
Defendant

Default Judgment was entered herein on November 26, 2002
A copy of the signed judgment is today served with a copy hereof upon
Daniel F. Van Woerkom
David C. Condie
Van Woerkom & Condie
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake City UT 84111
(Via First-Class^ U.S. Mail)
DATED THIS 17TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 200
/
/

fy°i<>

- ' - " ' ' i d cour/]

ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for Relator
243 East University Boulevard - 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803
Telephone 531-7923

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD UUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN
OFFICE, INC, a Utah corporation,
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

CJA 4-501 MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
BY DEFENDANT TO SET ASIDE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
KAL YNN NINOW, personal
representative of the estate of
Gary G. Pahl, deceased,

Civil No. 020908627
Judge Robert Hilder

Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant was served with process by a deputy constable and failed to
timely respond. Defendant's default was duly entered via the entry of a Default
Certificate by the clerk. Based on that Default Certificate, the court properly
entered Default Judgment on November 26, 2002. Over three months elapsed
before defendant moved to set aside the default judgment on March 17, 2003.
POINT ONE
Defendant's failure to file within three months is jurisdictional.
In a unanimous Utah Supreme Court decision written by Justice Durham
in Erickson v. Shenkers Intern. Forwarders. 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994), a motion
to set aside a default judgment that is entered after a Default Certificate is entered
for failure to timely respond to a summons is an "excusable neglect" motion that

must be filed within the three month deadline under URCP 60(b)(1). Since the
defendant did not file her URCP 60(b) motion to set aside the default judgment
until after the three month filing deadline set forth in URCP 60(b) had elapsed,
this court has no authority to grant her motion. This is jurisdictional. Indeed,
under the comparable federal rule 60(b), the grant of a motion under these
circumstances results in afinalorder that is directly appealable as a matter of
right rather than being an interlocutory order. 'There is now also substantial case
law support for the proposition that an appeal will lie from the grant of the motion
if the contention is that the court lacked power to grant it and not merely that it
erred in granting the motion. [Order granting motion for relief from judgment
would be treated asfinalfor purposes of appeal, when new trial was challenged
as beyond district court's authority on ground motion was not made within (the
federal rule 60(b) deadline). Citing National Passenger R.R. Corp. v. Maylie. 910
E2d 1181 (3rd Cir. 1990).]" Wright & Miller, Sec. 2871. As in the case at bar,
the defendant in Erickson v. Shenkers Intern. Forwarders, supra, had appeared
and filed papers between the time the Default Certificate was entered and the
time that the default judgment was entered. Yet, Justice Durham wrote that the
defendant was still required to file the motion to set aside within three months.
Defendant cannot use Subdivision (b)(4), because the judgment is not
void. Defendant cannot use Subdivision (b)(5), because she has not identified
any subsequent event that has rendered prospective application of the judgment
inequitable. See, inter alia, Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382
(Utah App. 1987). Defendant cannot use Subdivision (b)(6) to circumvent the
applicable three month deadline. Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, supra.
This court lacks any authority to set aside the default judgment because
the defendant failed to file a timely motion before three months had elapsed as
required under URCP 60(b) and Justice Durham's unanimous opinion in Erickson.

POINT TWO
No reasonable justification or excuse for the neglect has been given.
Justice Durham wrote in Erickson that if a motion to set aside a default
judgment is timely filed within three months, the second test that the movant must
satisfy is the showing of reasonable justification or excuse for failure to timely
file a responsive pleading or responsive motion. No such showing has been
made. Indeed, movant has failed to offer any explanation for wrhy she did not file
on time. Any attempt to do so in a reply memorandum should be disregarded as
untimely and going beyond the scope of matters raised within this memorandum.
POINT THREE
No defense of at least ostensible merit as would justify a trial of
the issue has been raised in any proposed responsive motion or pleading.
Under Justice Durham's unanimous opinion in Erickson. if timeliness and
a basis for relief under URCP 60(b) are established, the third test is whether the
defendant here has met her burden to "proffer some defense of at least ostensible
merit as would justify a trial of the issue thus raised." Conspicuously absent from
thefilingsmade by the defendant is any proposed answer or any proposed motion
containing a defense which may, at the option of the pleader, be raised by motion
under URCP 12 instead of by answer. Her untimely URCP 60(b) motion repeats
her untimely motion to dismiss in its attempts raise defenses ofres judicata, issue
preclusion, and claim preclusion, matters which may not be raised by motion, but
must be raised via pleading. And since the plaintiff herein was not a party to the
probate proceeding (and the personal representative did not follow-up on initial
limited rulings made in the probate proceeding), the orders entered in that probate
proceeding did not involve the matters embodied in the judgment herein. Even
though defendant has provided her prolix version of that which she claims was
done by Judge Medley, she has provided no copies of any of his actual orders.

Without copies of Judge Medley's actual orders, this court is not in a
position to interpret the actual language of those orders, to measure the scope and
reach of those orders, or to ascertain the identity of the persons and entities that
are bound by those orders. Since neither the relator herein, Diamond Fork Land
Company, nor the plaintiff herein, Pahi's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., were made
parties to any probate proceeding by KaLynn Ninow, the orders entered by Judge
Medley cannot, as a matter of law, create res judicata, issue preclusion, or claim
preclusion in this case due to the manner in which this case was pled and due to
the language in the default judgment entered herein. Thus, even if defendant had

j

timely filed a motion under URCP 60(b) within the required three-month period

I

(which she did not do, thereby depriving this court of the authority to grant her
motion), and even if she had offered a reasonable excuse or explanation showing
that her neglect in failing to respond to the summons and complaint in a timely
manner was "excusable" neglect (which she did not do), it would still be manifest
error for this court to grant her motion since, by failing to provide copies of the
orders entered by Judge Medley, she has not met her burden of making a proffer
showing that her res judicata, issue preclusion, and claim preclusion defense has
at least ostensible merit as would justify a trial of the issue she attempts to raise.
The default judgment in this case adjudicates the claim made on behalf of
Pahi's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., that 3000 of its shares were not the property
of Gary G. Pahl at the time of his death and are not property of said decedent's
estate. In the Utah Supreme Court case of In re Estate of Malliet 649 P.2d 18
(Utah 1982), such a dispute could not have been resolved by filing and processing
a claim against the estate under the probate code. It had to be made as part of this
independent action against the personal representative. This was properly done.
The default judgment entered herein is controlling and finally decides the
issue. There is no basis in Utah law for now setting that default judgment aside.

Wh5\

POINT FOUR
Third parties who have common interests with the plaintiff and the
relator in this matter have relied upon the default judgment entered herein.
A related corporation and two related individuals involved in related
litigation1 previously pending before Judge Sandra Peuler duly waited until after
the expiration of the three-month period for filing a URCP 60(b)(1) motion in this
case and, in reliance upon the judgment in this case and upon the failure of the
defendant to timely move to set it aside, voluntary dismissed that other case after
the major issues therein had been rendered moot by the judgment entered herein.
These same third parties also elected to raise the issues pled by them
herein as part of this independent action against the personal representative
instead of litigating them in a probate proceeding before Judge Tyrone Medley.
In reliance upon the default judgment entered by the court herein, they
limited the litigation before Judge Medley to other matters and then secured a
final judgment in their favor in the probate proceeding before Judge Medley.
That probate proceeding is now on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
A paper containing the following language was filed in Judge Peuler's case
and was duly served by mail upon David C. Condie on December 7, 2002:
"Since Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., was never made a
party to any probate proceeding before Judge Medley, it is Judge Hilder's
final judgment that adjudicates the matters that are contained therein."
Since the proceeding before Judge Medley and the case before Judge
Peuler were both concluded in the trial court in reliance upon Judge Hilder's
judgment herein, it would be very unjust to now set aside that judgment.

1

Counsel in this case madefilingsin that case, there was some overlap between
parties, and the default judgment entered herein mooted major issues in that case.

POINT FIVE
The pejorative remarks included in defendant's memorandum are of
no assistance to this court in resolving the legal issues that are present here.
Last year the Utah Supreme Court again reminded counsel that pejorative
remarks regarding opposing counsel are unprofessional and are of no assistance to
the courts in resolving legal issues. Prince v. Bear River Mutual Insurance. 2002
UT 68, 452 Utah Adv. Rep 50. The statements accusing the undersigned of filing
a frivolous lawsuit in order to harass the defendant do not advance the analysis.
CONCLUSION
The motion to set aside the default judgment shoi/ld be DENIED.
DATED THIS 24TH DAY OF MARCH, 2003.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of the foregoing was this-day caused to be HAND-CARRIED to:
David C. Condie
VAN WOERKOM & CONDIE
Attornj&ys^t Law
32 Exchange Place, Suite
Sai/Lake Qty UT 84111
DATED this 24f
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PA WAS SALT PLACE LOAN
OFFICE, INC, a Utah corporation,
ex rel. DIAMOND LAND FORK
COMPANY, A Ulah corporation,

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 020908627

KAYLYNN NINOW, personal
representative of (he estate of
Gary 0 . Pahl, deceased, and
individually,

Judge Robert K. ITilder

Defendant,

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is before the court for decision, The
parlies briefed (he original Motion, and the court heard argument, at which lime the court
mdicnlecl that it believed a Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Motion was time barred,
but that there might be grounds to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(a), or even under Rule
55, i)m underlying basis for a default judgment, pursuant to P & ]i Land v. Klungervik 751 P,2d
274 (Ut, App, 1988), The parties were requested to submit supplemental briefs addressing the
issue raised by the court. Now, haviug reviewed the briefs and the applicable law, the court rules
as follows;
Firsi, the court must exercise its option under Thurston v, Box Rider County and Trembly
v. Mrs Fields Cookies, to reconsider its previous decision regarding Rule 60(b), because the
couit is persuaded that it was in error as to the law, and nofinaljudgment hns entered based on
(ho court's bench ruling of May 2,2003,
That is, the court is still persuaded that as to any Motion based on subsections (1), (2) or
(3) of Rule 60(b), including motions under 60(b)(6) that could have been brought pursuant to any
ono of the first three subsections, the time limit is three months, and the court has no discretion lo
1

a£&3

extend that time.
Uul, the court is now persuaded, based on the facts of this case and the very recent Utah
Court of Appeals decision, Osegucra v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46
(February 21,2003), that Rule 60(b)(6), URCi\ provides a clear basis for relief from the default
judgment separate from grounds that may be asserted under the first three subsections. As the
court explained at the hearing, there is no doubt in this court's mind that the entry of default
results solely from court error, probably even more manifestly than was the case in OsQguera*
Notwithstanding plaintiffs assertion that the default was proper because the responsive pleading
was Uile, at the dale the clerk signed the default certificate (November 25,2002) and at the date
the court signed the default judgment (November 26,2002), a responsive pleading had been
filed. The responsive pleading may not have been physically in the court's file, but that was the
court's fault, ] The critical point is defendant had not "failed to plead or otherwise defend" (Rule
55(a), UUCP) at the time the default was sought.
In such a case, the clerk is not empowered to enter default, and there is ultimately no
basis for a judgment, and P & B Land makes it clear that the default is "improper or illegal, and
voidable." 751 P,2d at 277. It makes no sense to consider such a judgment illegal and voidable
if I lie court is nevertheless precluded from voiding the illegal judgment because defendant did
not comply strictly with a three month deadline. That is particularly true when, as here, the
deadline was missed by a relatively short time, and to some extent that was because plainti ff did
not give prompt notice of the judgment.
'Hie court still believes there may be u basis to set aside pursuant to Rule 60(a), URCP5
under (acts such as these and/or under the court's inherent powers to correct its own errors,
particularly in light of the direction given by the Oseguera court:
When the trial court's mislakes-not counsel's-are the reason a judgment is
improvidently entered iind the entry goes undetected, even if it remains undetected
for some time, the court should be anxious to whatever needs to done to fix the
mislake as soon as it is called to the court's attention.
Id atPaiu 12,
Despite this belief, based on its reconsideration of the availability of Rule 60(b)(6),
URC1\ and based on the court's determination that defendant clearly acted within a reasonable
lime after becoming aware of the default judgment, the court need not reach alternative bases.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to set Aside default Judgment be and hereby is

1

Plaintiff may argue that the pleading was deficient in some way, but that is properly a
subject of another motion,

2

H£&f

GRANTED and the Motion filed November 25,2002, is the responsive pleading lo which
plaintiff may direct any future motions. To the extent the defendant's Motion seeks
consolidation'of this ease with the earlier filed case before Judge Medley, that Motion must be
directed lo Judge Medley, This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of the court and no further
Order is required.
DATED this 12th day of June, 2003..
a&r**-t\+

t Court Judge
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ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
RM U • 26
Attorney for the Relator
Lo^~°
243 East University Boulevard - 200 _
. 'J •• 'T,
f
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803
- -Z ;, , .r . •< ^ V ^
Telephone 531-0099
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation,
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO VACATE THE ORDER
SETTING ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
KALYNN NINOW, personal
representative of the estate of
Gary G. Pahl, deceased,

Civil No. 020908627
Judge Robert Hilder

Defendant.
Pursuant to CJA 4-501, plaintiff moves the court to fully VACATE its
URCP 60(b)(6) order of June 12, 2003, on the grounds that (1) the June 12, 2003,
order's sua sponte "critical point" is clearly erroneous; (2) this court lacked the
authority needed to enter the order; and, (3) if not vacated, the order will have a
widespread adverse impact on the ability of national and local title insurers and
lenders to "quiet" Utah titles utilizing the URCP 60(b)(1) three-month deadline.
The sua sponte "critical point" that "defendant had not Tailed to plead or
otherwise defend' (Rule 55(a), URCP) at the time the default was sought" [June
12,2003, order, p. 2, emphasis added] is clearly erroneous. The default was
sought several days before the defendant responded to the summons on November
25,2002 Defendant had " 'failed to plead or otherwise defend' — (Rule 55(a),
URCP)" when default was sought (several days prior to November 25, 2002)

mosi

The default certificate and default judgment were correctly entered, there
is a sound legal basis for the default judgment, the judgment is not "improper or
illegal, and voidable" underP & Bland, 751 P2d at 277, Oseguera v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46 [February 21, 2003], is not applicable, and
this court lacked any authority to set aside the judgment under URCP 60(b)(6).
This court also lacks authority to set aside the judgment under URCP
60(a), since no "clerical" error was made by the court or its clerk. It was fully
defendant's fault that her default was entered because she did not timely "plead or
otherwise defend" on or before November 8, 2002 and she delayed doing so until
several days after the plaintiff sought the default. Defendant's predicament would
have been remediable under URCP 60(b)(1), but she cannot now bring a URCP
60(b)(6) motion she could have filed within three months under URCP 60(bXl).
This motion is supported bya memorandum and the affidavit of counsel.
DATED THIS

/. 2003.

OBERTJffiNRY COPIER
ttornev/ror the Relator
MAILING CERTIFICATE
A true copy hereof was this-day mailed to:
David C. Condie
Attorney at Law
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake CikaJT 84111
(Via First-Glas\ U.S.pail)

n

DATED THIS (7^D/YOF:
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KUBbRT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for the Relator
243 East University Boulevard - 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803
Telephone 531-0099

C2JUL-? AMI!: 26

EY

-TIf7uv Cir^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF.THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation,
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT HENRY COPIER

Plaintiff,
vs.
KALYNN NINOW, personal
representative of the estate of
Gary G. Pahl, deceased,

Civil No. 020908627
Judge Robert Hilder

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
)

County of Salt Lake

)

ss.

ROBERT HENRY COPIER, beingfirstduly sworn, deposes and says:
I am the attorney for the relator and have personal knowledge of the facts
stated in this affidavit, which relate to the procedural history of this case.
KaLynn Ninow was required to plead or otherwise defend by November 8,
2002. I waited a reasonable amount of time after November 8, 2002, to make
sure that the court file was up-to-date I then ascertained that KaLynn Ninow
had not filed anything I then sought entry of defendant's default and a default
judgment by submitting a proposed default certificate and default judgment.
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The proposed default certificate and default judgment were submitted by me
to the downstairs civil clerks at the Scott M. Matheson courthouse several
days before the clerk entered the default certificate on November 25,2002.
DATED THIS 20TH DAY/OF JI

'

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public of the State
of Utah, on this, the 20th day of June, 2003

30BH«n*w 28,2003
TWW « • * « . ,fdTh I

MAILING CERTIFICATE
A true copy of the foregoing was this-day mailed to:
David C. Coudie
Attorney at Law
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake City UT 84111
(Via First-Class U.S. Mail)
r,

DATED THIS ^

DAY O,

i\DUO

ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
, u u. ? n
Attorney for the Relator
n- \\'/< - ° * ?i \: • i
243 East University Boulevard - 200"' *
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 : ' 7 ; . : . . .
Telephone 531-0099
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation,
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION
TO VACATE THE ORDER
SETTING ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
KALYNN NINOW, personal
representative of the estate of
Gary G. Pahl, deceased,

Civil No. 020908627
Judge Robert Hilder

Defendant.
Pursuant to CJA 4-501, plaintiff has moved the court to VACATE its
order of June 12, 2003, setting aside the default judgment under URCP 60(b)(6).
The premise that the court itself identified as "the critical point" is clearly
erroneous. This apparently occurred because the court raised the point for the
first time sua sponte in its June 12, 2003, order, causing the court to make this
erroneous "critical point" without benefit of any briefing thereof by the parties.
This motion to vacate is made on the ground that the June 12,2003, order
contains the erroneous sua sponte "critical point" that "defendant had not Tailed
to plead or otherwise defend' (Rule 55(a), URCP) at the time the default was
sought." [June 12, 2003, Order, P. 2, emphasis added]. The default was, in fact,
sought several days before the defendant responded to the summons on November
25, 2002. At the time the default was sought (several days prior to November 25,
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2002), the defendant had indeed,f Tailed to plead or otherwise defend' .. .(Rule
55(a), URCP)." Due to this, the clerk was empowered to enter the default and it
was not an error for him to do so, there is a legal basis for the default judgment,
the judgment is not "improper or illegal, and voidable" under P & B Land, 751
P2d at 277, there is clearly no basis for setting aside the default judgment under
Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46 [February 21, 2003],
and this court lacked the authority needed to set aside the judgment under URCP
60(b)(6). This court also lacks authority to set aside the judgment under URCP
60(a) because there was no "clerical" error made by the court or its clerk and it
was defendant's fault that her default was entered because she did not timely
"plead or otherwise defend" on or before November 8,2002 and she delayed
doing so until several days after the plaintiff had already sought the default.
While defendant's predicament would have been readily remediable under
URCP 60(b)(1), she compounded her failure to timely respond to the summons
with her failure to move under URCP 60(b)(1) within three months and she
cannot bring a URCP 60(b)(6) motion she could have brought under URCP
60(b)(1). The delay of several days between the time the default was sought and
the time defendant responded makes the court's "critical point" in its order
erroneous. The clerk was fully empowered to enter the default and actually had a
nondiscetionary affirmative and mandatory ministerial duty to enter the default
when it was sought by plaintiff several days prior to November 25, 2002, since
defendant had not timely pled or otherwise defended by November 8, 2002:
"Rule 55(a). . . requires the clerk to 'enter' the default
when the fact of default is made known. If an answer or
other responsive pleading or motion were due to be filed
within a given number of days, the 'fact' of the 'default'
would 'appear' to the clerk at the close of the last day for
filing." Moore's Federal Practice 3rd, Sec. 55 1 l[3][a].

This is not a case where it has been shown that a response to a summons
wasfiledprior to the time the clerk entered the default. This is a case where a
response was due on November 8, 2002, but was filed late on November 25,
2002. Byfilinglate, defendant bore all the risk that her response was not in the
court file when the clerk duly entered defendant's default on November 25, 2002.
Since plaintiff had properly sought defendant's default several days before
November 25, 2002, when nothing had been filed by defendant, and since the
defendant's response was not in the court file when the clerk entered the default, it
is of no consequence that a response wasfiledon November 25, 2002. It does not
matter whether or not the response was in the building when default was entered,
since the clerk was empowered to enter the default and properly did his duty.
However, even though the timing of the default on November 25, 2002,
vis-a-vis thefilingof defendant's response on November 25, 2002, is not of any
consequence, the court, in its June 12, 2003, order, states defendant's response
"had beenfiled"when the default was entered. This is pure speculation by the
court that is highly unfair to the plaintiff There is no basis for the court's
statement in anything that has been served upon the relator or its counsel.l
Nothing in the record establishes that defendant's response was filed
before the clerk entered the default on November 25, 2002, or excludes the
possibility that it was filed on November 25, 2002, after default was entered, and
the court's speculation in this regard is highly unfair to the plaintiff and improper.
1

It is undisputed in the record that defendant has engaged in ex parte practice in
this case, so relator and its counsel may not have received all of the information
defendant has presented to the court. However, since the June 12, 2003, order
makes no reference to a basis for the statement that defendant's response was in
the court building when default was entered on November 25,2002, the statement
is pure impermissible speculation by the court that is highly unfair to the plaintiff
and is directly contrary to the presumption that the clerk's actions are valid.

The court's improper speculation in this regard puts the June 12,2003,
order at odds with the fundamental principle of civil procedure taught to first-year
law students that there is a refutable presumption that the clerk performed his
duty and a motion to challenge the clerk's actions must be brought within three
months under URCP 60(b)(1) [or comparable shorter or longer deadlines in other
states],- since the action by the clerk is, at most, merely voidable, and is not void.
Since the record reveals that both the entry of default and the response by
the defendant occurred on November 25, 2002, but does not give a time during
that day when either occurred, the presumption applies here. This refutable
presumption places the entry of default at some point in the day earlier than the
filing of defendant's response. Defendant has made no contrary showing that her
filing was attempted prior to the entry of the default, and, importantly, she had to
do so within the three-month deadline Utah has selected under URCP 60(b)(1).
A typical case in a typical first-year law school casebook sets this out:
"It is well settled that in the absence of a showing to the contrary a public
officer, such as the clerk of the court in this case, is presumed to have
performed the duty imposed upon him by law. * * * Since the judgment
of the lower court is merely voidable, at most, Rule 60(c) of the Arizona
Rules of Civil Procedure prevents the defendant from attacking the
judgment more than six months after it was entered." Udall, C J., Coulas
v. Smith, 395 P.2d 527 (Ariz. 1964), from Cound, Friedenthal, Miller, and
Sexton, Civil Procedure, Cases and Materials, Fourth Edition, p. 792.
Since the case at bar involves divesting and vesting of title to property, it
is not outside of the realm of possibility that the June 12, 2003, order's failure to
apply the three-month deadline would attract amicus attention during appeal from
lenders and title insurers who see the June 12, 2003, order as a Utah aberration
making it hard to quiet a Utah title in reliance on the URCP 60(b)(1) deadline.2

Correcting the erroneous June 12, 2003, order by vacating it would solve this.

Plaintiffs position in this case regarding this court's lack of authority to set
aside the default judgment under URCP 60(a) because there was no "clerical"
mistake reachable under URCP 60(a) and this court's lack authority to set aside
the default judgment under URCP 60(b) because defendant cannot bring a URCP
60(b)(6) motion which she could have brought under URCP 60(b)(1) but failed to
timely do so, is a position of simplicity, integrity, clarity, and strength which has
never been squarely met by defendant, who has not even given a good excuse for
failing to timely respond to the summons or timely move under URCP 60(b)(1).
Instead, defendant has responded with bitter censures and uncharitable
imputations regarding relator and its counsel. This has apparently been done in
order to tempt the court to torture the record and rape the law in pursuit of some
abstract notion of fairness, equity, and justice for one Ryan Pahl which rests on
nothing but the flimsy, frail, and feeble framework of classical human intuition.
The court should not yield to this temptation, because even if it were to do
so, the record and the law are surely sturdy enough to withstand such an assault
The court earlier in this case properly granted a motion to strike the prolix
and voluminous filings in this case by which defendant sought to divert the court's
attention away from the record and the law in search of a result-oriented order.
As a personal representative, KaLynn Ninow is duty-bound to honor the
business structure left in place by Gary Pahl. Instead, she falsely claims that her
son Ryan Pahl is a "devisee" even though there was no will and she also fails to
recognize that Ryan Pahl is a pretermitted heir without recourse to the extent that
Gary Pahl, while alive, divested himself of property in a corporate structure.3
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Indeed, it is the rejection of the kind of ancient entitlement-by-blood claims
made for Ryan Pahl that has allowed modern corporation law to create so much
prosperity by placing authority in boards of directors, not in the courts or in heirs.

KaLynn Ninow, as the mother of Gary Pahl's primogenitus Ryan Pahl, has
aggressively pursued litigation on her son's behalf. Certainly, this must give her
attorneys some pause, since vacating the June 12, 2003, order will effectively
remit KaLynn Ninow to her claims for relief against her attorneys for negligence.
No one takes any delight in seeing fellow members of the bar have their
clients turn on them and sue them for professional negligence. And missing a
jurisdictional deadline like KaLynn Ninow's attorneys did in this case usually
creates a slam dunk on the issue of liability for professional negligence. While
liability for negligence appears clear-cut in this case, the issue of damages is a
completely different matter As to damages, there are none, because KaLynn
Ninow would not be able to prove her "case within a case". The motions she has
filed to date in this case lack merit and she has no meritorious defenses that she
could raise to the claims that have now been reduced to a judgment herein.
Thus, even though her attorneys' negligence appears clear-cut, she has
suffered no damages, because she would not have prevailed on the merits even if
her attorneys had timely answered or timely filed under URCP 60(b)(1). This is
argued here, because, even though the order of June 12, 2003, does not expressly
state that it is entered in an attempt to spare defendant's attorneys from liability
for their professional negligence, it would be understandable if that is somewhat
of a rationale that subtly influenced the court to enter the June 12, 2003, order.
KaLynn Ninow's claim of entitlement to vote more than half of the shares
of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc , was duly rejected by the corporation and
no court of competent jurisdiction has overruled the corporation in this regard.4
No extraordinary measures are needed to protect her attorneys.
4

There is no basis for overruling the corporation under corporation records that
KaLynn Ninow controls and refuses to produce for the court or counsel, using
every legal tactic available to her to delay the production of all of these records.
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KaLynn Ninow, as an unjust plaintiff in any such case against her own
attorneys [and an unjust petitioner in the original probate proceeding in which she
never joined Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., as a party], has invoked the law
in her attempt to circumvent both the corporation's records and the institutional
memory of its directors, and she should, thus, be dealt with according to the law.
"With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again."
KaLynn Ninow could not prevail in any action against her own attorneys
because, in the probate proceeding, KaLynn Ninow attempted to circumvent the
corporation's records and the institutional memory of its directors with primarily
three affidavits (1) her own affidavit; (2) the affidavit of Frank Pahl; and (3) the
affidavit of Robert Mortensen. In her own affidavit, she claimed to divulge the
contents of records over which she has obtained exclusive control, but she never
produced the records, contrary to the Utah Rules of Evidence. In the affidavit of
Frank Pahl, KaLynn Ninow purports to prove what happened to 3000 shares of
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., stock after Frank Pahl transferred them to
William Lowe. However, in a subsequent affidavit, Frank Pahl concedes that he
has no personal knowledge of this [and is, thus, not a competent witness on this
point]. In the affidavit of Robert Mortensen [who was not a director before Gary
Pahl's death], KaLynn Ninow purports to prove that the 1500 shares sold by Robert
Mortensen to Grand Staircase Land Company had been held in trust by Mortensen
for Ryan Pahl. However, when Mortensen later provided the attached response to
a document request [something KaLynn Ninow has fought tooth-and-nail to delay
in doing], Mortensen admitted there were no documents creating any such trust.5
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Such a trust would not have vitiated the sale to Grand Staircase Land Company,
but would have exposed Mortensen to liability. KaLynn Ninow has no defenses
that can work in this case and has suffered no damages from her lawyers' errors.

The wisdom and the insight underlying the Utah Rules of Evidence is very
apparent when one considers the completely outrageous manner in which KaLynn
Ninow has falsely represented the contents of documents while at the same time
refusing to turn over the documents for review by her adversaries and the courts.
A similar phenomenon in this case has arisen in connection with the prolix
and voluminous documents from other cases that she has dumped into the court
file (which were properly stricken by the court) in her efforts to demonstrate that
something took place in another case that, in fact, did not occur or, if it occurred,
was not binding upon the persons or interests in property that she asserts it was.
Counsel for relator has used care in identifying entities and individuals he
represents and entities and individuals he does not represent in any given matter.6
As an example, KaLynn Ninow adamantly insists that Pahl's Salt Palace
Loan Office, Inc., and Diamond Fork Land Company were parties to the probate
proceeding before Judge Medley. This is simply not the case. A copy of Judge
Medley's Minute Entry Order of May 1, 2003, is annexed hereto, It clearly sets
forth the identity of the petitioner, respondents, and third-party respondents. It is
clear that neither Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., nor Diamond Fork Land
Company, were parties to that action. It is particularly significant that Pahl's Salt
Palace Loan Office, Inc., was not a party, because it means that the corporation's
rejection of KaLynn Ninow's attempt to elect new directors because there was no
quorum present stands and no court of competent jurisdiction has ever changed it.
And that any finding, conclusion, or order that she owns more than half of
the shares is simply not binding on the corporation or on the actual share owners.
KaLynn Ninow has suffered no damages from her attorneys' neglect

For example, see annexed letter dated June 30, 2003.
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In short, the default judgment does not expose KaLynn Ninow's lawyers to
real liability to their client for damages for their neglect. To the extent that this
concern influenced the court's action in erroneously setting aside the judgment, it
should no longer be of concern to the court for all of the foregoing reasons. The
Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange case provides no precedent applicable
to this case, because there was no mistake made by the court or clerk in entering
the default and the only mistake that has been made by the court in this case is
erroneously concluding that defendant had already responded when the default
was sought when, in fact, default was sought several days prior to that response.
Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange is a unique case limited to
its own unique factual situation. The majority opinion in that case was obviously
influenced by the Court of Appeals' concern that the trial judge had given an
erroneous version of the record and that they could not affirm her version. That
case did not involve quieting of title like this case. The URCP 60(b)(1) deadline
of three months is very important in being able to quiet a title. The vacating of
the default judgment was erroneous and sets a bad precedent that may draw the
legitimate concern of financial institutions and the title insurance community. [Of
course, the practical effect in this case is not as Draconian as it would be if this
case involved real estate. After the November 26, 2002, judgment divested title
to personal property located within Utah and vested it in others pursuant to URCP
70, the property was moved out-of-state. Thus, setting aside the judgment does
not reach those shares or their owners, since URCP 70 applied only to the original
action of the court on November 26, 2002, an action which has not been reversed
by setting aside the judgment because the property is now out-of-state. And in the
period between the entry of judgment on November 26, 2002, and the entry of the
ex parte stay of the judgment earlier this year, William Lowe and Augusta Rose,
as corporate officers and directors, did all the relevant corporate housekeeping.]

CONCLUSION
Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange does not help the defendant in
this case because there was no error made by the court or the clerk in entering the
default, since the defendant had not pled or otherwise defended when default was
sought, contrary to the clearly erroneous "critical point" made in the court's order.
Instead, Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange actually helps
the plaintiff herein in its sound doctrine that this court should correct its own
errors when they are called to this court's attention, as has now been done here.
Since this court had no authority to set aside the default judgment under
URCP 60(b)(6), and has no authority to set aside the default judgment under
URCP 60(a), the court should correcois error and vacate its June 12, 2003, order.
DATED THIS ^ ^ - D A ^ Q F
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LY COPIER
for the Relator
MAILING CERTIFICATE
A true copy hereof was this-day mailed to:
David C. Condie
Attorney at Law
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake CitjOJT 84111
(Via First-(flass tf.S. Mail)
DATED THIS A^JDAY

OF

WIO

James W. McConkie, III (8614)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Robert K. Mortensen

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
THE ESTATE OF
GARY G. PAHL,

ROBERT K. MORTENSEN'S
RESPONSES TO FIRST
REQUEST FOR DOCUMENT
PRODUCTION

Deceased.
Case No. 003901101
Judge: Tyrone E. Medley
Robert K. Mortensen hereby responds to Respondents Grand Staircase Land
Company, William Lowe and Augusta Rose's First Request for Document Production as
follows:
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1.

All documents creating, pertaining to, memorializing, or in any way

connected with the alleged trust, and the shares that you claim you held in trust, as referred
to in paragraph number 8 of your affidavit dated June 25, 2002, a copy of which is annexed
hereto and by this reference is made a part hereof.
ITES
LER
1e900
outh
ty
I
00

ANSWER:

None.

nvl

2.

All correspondence between you and/or your attorney(s) and Ryan Pahl,

KaLynn Ninow, and/or any attorneys who represent(ed) them, including, but not limited to
David C. Condie, Van Woerkem and Condie, or associated attorneys, that was sent or
received between May 1, 2002 and the date of production.
ANSWER:

Those documents presently in my possession which are responsive to request

no. 2 are attached hereto. I further reserve the right to supplement this response should I
identify addition responsive documents in the future.
3.

All other documents pertaining to the shares of stock referred to in paragraph

number 8 of your affidavit dated June 25, 2002, in your possession or in the possession of
any attorney(s) who represent you or have represented you.
ANSWER:

None. However, I reserve the right to supplement this response should I

identify responsive documents in the future.
DATED this P

day of August, 2002.

/f
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Robert K. Mortensen
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this j±__ day of August, 2002.

My Commjss^n^xpjres^ mtm
P ^ S ^ T

""""Notary Public
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SattUke City, Utah 84111
My Commission Expires
Novtmber12,2003
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Notary Pubhc
Residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah
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LAW OFFICES

ROBERT HENRY C O P I E R
ATTORNEY & CERTIFIED PUBUC ACCOUNTANT
SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE
243 EAST UNIVERSITY BOULEVARD - 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-2803
TELEPHONE (801) 531-7923
24-HOUR VOICE MAIL (801) 272-2222
FAX (801) 531-7928

June 30,2003
Daniel R Van Woerkom and Sandra K. Weeks
VAN WOERKOM REED & WEEKS, L.C.
2975 West Executive Parkway, Suite 128
Lehi UT 84043
David C Condie
VAN WOERKOM & CONDIE
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake Cit^ UT 84111
Re: P&hV$ Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc.
Dear Messrs. Van Woerkom and Condie and Ms. Weeks:
As you know, I have served as an attorney for William Lowe since August, 2000, and
have served as an attorney for Augusta Rose since June, 2002, in connection with their
positions as both officers and directors of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc , a Utah
corporation. Today is the last day of the second quarter of 2003 and I am involved in
quarter-end housekeeping for a number of corporations and/or corporation officers and
directors that I serve as a legal advisor In that regard, I note that you have still not yet
provided some information that has previously been requested from you. Kindly provide
me with copies of the front and back of stock certificates evidencing KaLynn Ninow's
ownership of s. res of the said corporation Kindly pj#vide me with the date on which
.ynn Nino fconveyed the beneficial ownership^! those shares to her son, Ryan Pahl.

ugusta Rose
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of

:

MINUTE ENTRY

GARY G. PAHL,

:

CASE NO. 003901101

Deceased-

:

KALYNN NINOW,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs •
GRAND STAIRCASE LAND COMPANY, a :
Utah corporation, WILLIAM LOWE,
AUGUSTA ROSE and ROBERT
MORTENS EN,
Respondents,
vs •
RYAN PAHL, KALYNN NINOW,
RICHARD NINOW, and DOES I-V,
Third Party respondents.
The

personal

Conclusions

of

-:

representative's

Law

and

Order

Proposed

Granting

Findings

Fact,

Judgment,

and

respondent's Objections thereto are submitted to the Court

for

decision pursuant to Rule 4-501.

Summary

of

Having reviewed all relevant

documents, including respondent's Objections and the Reply thereto,
the Court rules as follows.
1.

Respondent's

Objections

are hereby

denied

as without

merit and unsupported by any cited,authority.

ao74

PAGE 2

PAHL ESTATE
2.

MINUTE ENTRY

The Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Order Granting

Summary Judgment are hereby

signed and entered

without modification.
3.

This signed Minute Entry shall constitute the Order of

the Court resolving the matter referenced herein, no further Order
is required.
Dated this /

_day of May, 2 0CKX

kffr^dfr
TYRONE/E, MEDLEY
DISTRICT COURT

PAHL ESTATE

PAGE 3

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this

j__ day of May,

2003:

Robert H. Copier
Attorney for Respondents
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Daniel F. Van Woerkom
David Condie
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE

MINUTES
PROBATE MINUTES

OF GARY G. PAHL
Case No: 003901101 EF
Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

LESLIE A. LEWIS
April 6, 2005

chells

PRESENT
Petitioner's Attorney: HALA L AFU JR
RAY G MARTINEAU
Other Parties: SANDRA K WEEKS
ROBERT HENRY COPIER
Video
Tape Number:
2:07 pm

Counsel stipulate that the summary judgment is withdrawn. Counsel
argues the order to show cause. The Court takes the order to show
cause issue under advisement and will render a written ruling. Mr
Copier argues the issue of the undertaking. Ms Weeks gives opposing
arguments. The Court orders the motion for the undertaking is
denied. Mr Copier makes a motion in regards to rule 11. A rule 11
motion has not been filed, and therefore denied. Mr Copier makes a
motion in regards to the ruling on 6/12/03 be vacated. The Court
orders the motion to vacate is denied. Ms Weeks makes a motion to
stay any remaining pending motions until a ruling on the order to
show cause. Mr Copier stipulates to the motion.

Page 1 (last)
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By.

ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for Respondent William Lowe
17 East 400 South
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Telephone (801) 272-2222

O'eputy OhfiT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION

In the matter of the estate of

RULING AND ORDER

GARYG.PAHL,
Deceased.

Probate No. 003901101
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

KALYNN NINOW, personal representative
of the Estate of Gary Gunther Pahl and guardian
and conservator of the Estate of Ryan B, Pahl,
Petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM LOWE, AUGUSTA ROSE,
and ROBERT H. COPIER,
Respondents.
Having taken certain matters under advisement at a hearing on April 6,
2005, the court now rules thereon and enters this order. As all other matters that
have been brought by any party under this probate number have now been ruled
upon or withdrawn, this shall constitute the final order as to all claims and all
parties to any and all probate proceedings pending under this probate number.
The court has now read the written response to the order to show cause that
was filed by William Lowe prior to the April 6, 2005, hearing that the court had not
yet seen at the time of the hearing. The court has also read Lowe's answer and jury
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demand dated April 19, 2005, and Lowe's motion and memorandum dated April
19, 2005, seeking an evidentiary trial separate from the other named respondents.
The court has also read the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Ninow
v. Lowe, 2004 UT App 291, wherein the Utah Court of Appeals stated "we reverse
the trial court's determination that Lowe was in contempt of court for violating the
TRO." [See Ninow v. Lowe, 2004 UT App 291; Page 3 of 6; Paragraph L]
The court is persuaded that Lowe would be entitled to an evidentiary trial
before another such determination that Lowe is contempt of court could be entered
against him. The court is further persuaded that even if everything that KaLynn
Ninow, the petitioner, has presented to the court, or could present to the court, and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, are viewed in the light that is most
favorable to Ninow, this court is unable to conclude that Lowe has disobeyed any
"judgment, order or process of the court" [UCA Sec. 78-32-1(5)] or that Lowe
engaged in any of the other acts or omissions constituting contempt enumerated in
Section 1 of Chapter32 of Title 78 of the Utah Code [2005]. Therefore, the court
is persuaded that it is proper to dismiss this proceeding as to Lowe without the need
to conduct an evidentiary trial Petitioner has also named Augusta Rose as one of
the respondents in this proceeding. While she has not yet been served with an
order to show cause and is not yet before the court, the court concludes that her
involvement in any alleged contempt, if any, did not include some of the acts that
were alleged against William Lowe, and that this proceeding should be dismissed as
to Rose for the same reason that it is being dismissed as to Lowe. Petitioner has
also named Robert Henry Copier, counsel for Lowe in this proceeding and counsel
for Lowe and Rose in other matters, as a respondent. Copier has not been served
with an order to show cause and is not yet before the court as a party. Having now
concluded that this proceeding should be dismissed as to Lowe and Rose, the court
is persuaded that this proceeding should be dismissed as to Copier as well. It is
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further noted by the court that Copier represented other clients in proceedings
under this probate and in other civil cases who were not parties to any preliminaiy
injunction, that Copier was not a party to any preliminary injunction, and that there
has been no showing that Lowe and Rose had the right to exercise control over
Copier's other clients or to direct Copier in his representation of those clients. It is
also noted that Copier's activities as an attorney of record in litigation are subject to
privileges and immunities for activities undertaken in the course of litigation. For
all of these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the above-entitled proceeding
styled as KaLynn Ninow vs. William Lowe, Augusta Rose, and Robert H. Copier,
is hereby DISMISSED. It appears that all other proceedings that were previously
pending under this probate number have also been concluded, and that Lowe and
Rose withdrew all other matters in which they sought affirmative relief, giving as
their reason the following three factors: [1] the court, as of April 6, 2005, has now
ruled upon Respondents' Motion to Vacate Order Setting Aside Default Judgment;
[2] Ryan Pahl has reached the age of majority and has had a reasonable amount of
time to dismiss Ninow as his guardian and take control of his property; and [3] the
Utah corporation Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., has now ceased business
operations and the land and buildings under its control have been sold, stripping the
corporation of any value. It is noted that Ninow is still the guardian of Ryan Pahl
even though Ryan Pahl has reached the age of majority and that William Lowe and
Augusta Rose have claimed herein that they had hoped to prevent Ninow from
closing down the business operations and selling the land and buildings until Ryan
Pahl reached the age of majority and had had a reasonable amount of time to
dismiss Ninow as his guardian and take control of his property. It is noted that
Ninow has been engaged in litigation over property with extended Pahl family
members other than Lowe and Rose and that said protracted litigation was only
recently resolved without any adjudication on the merits from any trial court. Any

delay experienced by Ninow in selling the land and buildings was not solely a result
of litigation in which only Lowe, Rose, and/or Copier were involved with her as
parties or counsel. She has been able to close down the business operations of
PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and sell the land and buildings in which those
business operations were conducted without any court order on the merits in any of
the litigation in which she was involved with Lowe, Rose, and their counsel Copier,
and litigation with Pahl family members independent of Lowe, Rose, and Copier.
Accordingly, this final order dismissing the proceeding styled as KaLynn
Ninow vs. William Lowe, Augusta Rose, and Robert H. Copier concludes all
litigation now pending or that had been pending under Probate No. 003901101.
DATED THIS 2 ^ DAY OF APRIL, 2005.
BY Tm COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of the foregoing [proposed] ruling and order was this-day mailed to:
Daniel Van Woerkom/gandra jWeeks/Hala Afu
2975 West Executiv^TarkwayJ, Suite 414
Lehi UT 84043
DATED THIS 21ST DA^ OF APRHi

Third Judicial District

JUL 1 4 2000
SALT LAK£= COUNTY

By—.,

Daniel F. Van Woerkom (USB #8500)
Sandra K. Weeks (USB #8491)
Hala L. Afu (USB #8967)
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, LC
2975 West Executive Parkway, Suite 414
Lehi, Utah 84043
Telephone: (801) 407-8330
Facsimile: (801) 407-8331
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary Gunther Pahl and
as Guardian and Conservator of the Estate of Ryan B. Pahl
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKJE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
GARY G. PAHL,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR A STAY

Deceased.

KALYNN NINOW, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Gary
Gunther Pahl and as Guardian and
Conservator of the Estate of Ryan B. Pahl,

Probate No. 003901101
Judge Lewis

Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM LOWE, AUGUSTA ROSE,
ROBERT H. COPIER,
Respondents,
Kalynn Ninow, by and through her above named counsel, hereby responds to the
Respondents' motion (dated June 24, 2005) for a stay of contempt proceedings as follows.
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1.

The Motion to Stay should be denied as the contempt proceeding is the only remaining
matter in which Respondents' have an interest in this case. Once the issue of contempt is
decided, this probate case will be able to move speedily toward conclusion.

2.

The Motion to Stay should be denied as Respondents have already requested and were
granted one continuance of the contempt hearing from June 29, 2005, to July 21, 2005.
The July 21, 2005 date was selected by Respondents' counsel. Any further delays will
substantially prejudice Petitioner in her efforts to conclude this matter.

3.

There is no need to have the preliminary injunction lifted as the record in this case clearly
shows that Respondents have been removed as officers and directors of the Loan Office
and that they have no authority to act on behalf of the Loan Office.

4.

The preliminary injunction entered in this case should be converted to a permanent
injunction as prayed in the contempt pleadings filed and on record in this matter. Any
stay of the contempt proceedings will prejudice Petitioner in her attempts to protect the
estate from Respondents' repeated and continual attempts to improperly exercise control
over the assets of the estate.
Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that Respondents' motion for a stay be denied

in full and that the contempt proceeding on July 21, 2005 be heard as scheduled.
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DATED thisX; day of July, 2005.
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, LC

Daniel F. Van Woerkom
Sandra K. Weeks
Hala L. Afu
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the jy day oi July, 2005,1 placed in the mail, postage prepaid,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing addressed as follows:
Robert Copier
17 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for Respondents
William Lowe and Augusta Rose
East 400 South
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Telephone (801) 272-2222

j y ^ \ g gQDS
SALT LAKH COUNTY
SAiTiAgEj
Peputy Clark
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION

In the matter of the estate of
GARY G. PAHL,
Deceased.

REPLY MEMORANDUM OF
AUGUSTA ROSE IN SUPPORT
O F H E R M O T I O N F O R A STAY
Probate No. 003901101
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

In the matter of the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, deceased
[Ninow v. Lowe II (Estate of Pahl)]

KaLynn Ninow
Petitioner
vs.
William Lowe, Augusta Rose, Robert H. Copier,
and Diamond Fork Land Company, Inc.
Respondents

Augusta Rose
Counter-petitioner, Cross-petitioner, and Third-party Petitioner
vs.
KaLynn Ninow, DDTS Properties LLC. Cathy Jean Libia Cherri Lynn Butters,
Joan Christensen Bastemeyer, Susan Lily Pahl Viklund, Lois Frank Pahl Koford,
Gloria Pamela Pahl Ewell, Ryan Pahl, and John/Jane Does 7-10,
individually and as personal representatives and guardians of the estates
and/or persons of Ryan Pahl, Gary G. Pahl, and/or A. Gunther Pahl
Third-party Respondents

Tr£ft\

Augusta Rose replies in support of her motion to stay by quoting from
KaLynn Ninow's memorandum and then giving her specific reply to each sentence.
"1. The Motion to Stay should be denied as the contempt proceeding is
the only remaining matter in which Respondents have an interest in this case."
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: Based on this new admission by KaLynn
Ninow, KaLynn Ninow should immediately release Augusta Rose as a party to
KaLynn Ninow's May 29, 2002, petition [Ninow v. Lowe I (Estate of PahT)],
leaving only Augusta Rose's counterclaims/third-party claims for defamation in that
proceeding. Ms. Ninow previously made this same admission in correspondence
between counsel, but then retracted it. Now that she has made it in a public court
filing, it is operative and the estoppel that was created by the preliminary injunction
will be eliminated by lifting the injunction. Until this admission was formally made
on July 8, 2005, KaLynn Ninow was estopped from asserting that William Lowe
and Augusta Rose had been removed as officers and directors of PahTs Salt Palace
Loan Office, Inc., because (1) she was still keeping them under the preliminary
injunction; (2) she claimed that she was doing so to pursue litigation as to which the
preliminary injunction should stay in place; (3) if William Lowe and Augusta Rose
had been removed as officers in May of 2002, there would be no need for such
litigation as to respondents after August of 2002 and no need for the preliminary
injunction. Now that KaLynn Ninow admits that William Lowe and Augusta Rose
have no interest in the May 29, 2002, petition, there is no longer a basis for keeping
the preliminary injunction in place, since nothing further will be litigated on the
merits as to William Lowe and Augusta Rose and their removal as officers is
operative as of July 8, 2005. Had KaLynn Ninow made this important admission
earlier, lifted the preliminary injunction, and withdrawn her assertion that the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in August of 2002 was only a partial one as to
William Lowe and Augusta Rose after the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the May

15 2003, order in which they were interested, the estoppel would have ended much
sooner and the entire matter would have been ended no later than April 6, 2005.1
"7 (continued). Once the issue of contempt is decided, this probate case
will be able to move speedily toward a conclusion."
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: The outcome of the contempt proceeding
is irrelevant to other matters in this probate and the ruling on contempt, whether
favorable or unfavorable to Ms. Ninow, has no bearing on her ability to move this
probate case to a conclusion, speedily or not. After securing a ruling from this
court that the May 1, 2003,Wder on her May 29, 2002, petition was a "partial"
summary judgment on her May 29, 2002, petition, Ms. Ninow has now admitted,
effective July 8, 2005, that William Lowe and Augusta Rose have no interest in her
May 29, 2002, petition. This exposes that her use of that petition as a pretext for
keeping Augusta Rose under an injunction was a sham and a fraud on the court and
confirms Augusta Rose's contention that Ms. Ninow would never actually pursue
her May 29, 2002, petition against Augusta Rose beyond the May 1, 2003, order.
"2. The Motion to Stay should be denied as Respondents have already
requested and were granted one continuance of the contempt hearing from June
29,2005, to July 21, 2005."
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: The prior continuance was appreciated by
counsel for Augusta Rose. The prior continuance is irrelevant l< > the ground for the
motion for a stay. That ground is that the evidentiary hearing on alleged contempt
will be more efficient if all matters on the merits have first been concluded. There
has already been great confusion in this case in failing to discern the distinctions
1

KaLynn Ninow is attempting to have the court hold Augusta Rose in contempt
for arguments made in litigation. It is necessary to remake those arguments to show
that they were not made in "knowing" and "willful" disobedience of a duty imposed
by a court order. The arguments are not being renewed for purposes of the merits.

between arguments being made in opposition to contempt and arguments being
made on the merits. By concluding everything going to the merits first, the court
will be simplifying the contempt proceeding and will be limiting it to only contempt.
"2 (continued). Any farther delays will substantially prejudice Petitioner
in her efforts to conclude this matter."
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: KaLynn Ninow has identified no specific
substantial prejudice that she will endure if the court requires her to first speedily
conclude matters remaining under her May 29, 2002, petition before litigating the
contempt hearing. Indeed, requiring this may help spur Ms. Ninow into action.
"3. There is no need to have the preliminary injunction lifted as the
record in this case clearly shows that Respondents have been removed as officers
and directors of the Loan Office and that they have no authority to act on behalf
of the Loan Office."
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: Augusta Rose agrees that effective July 8,
2005, from and after April 6, 2005 [the date2 of this court's denial of the motion to
vacate the June 12, 2003, order], the record in this case shows that respondents
hmc been removed as officers and directors of the Loan Office and that they teve
2

William Lowe and Augusta Rose asked the Utah Court of Appeals to exercise its
discretion to review the June 12, 2003, order as part of the appeal, since the case in
which that order had been entered was consolidated into Ninow v. Lowe I (Estate
ofPahD while that proceeding was on appeal. In its decision, the Utah Court of
Appeals [1] scaled-back the TRO to its stated 11:00 a.m expiration time; [2] ruled
that William Lowe was not in contempt of court; [3] reversed the award of attorney
fees; [4] affirmed the May 1, 2003 summary judgment on alternative grounds (the
probate court had based the May 1, 2003, summary judgment on its ruling that the
"December agreement" was void ab initio while the Utah Court of Appeals deemed
the "December agreement" to be fully "valid" and "binding" and also determinative
of share ownership and that Gary Pahl owned all 6000 shares at death); and, [5]
ruled William Lowe was not entitled to keep the $7500 based on the Utah Court of
Appeals affirmance of the May 1, 2003, summaiy judgment on these alternative
grounds. The Utah Court of Appeals then declined to address the June 12, 2003,
order. For this reason, there was a delay until April 6, 2005, to get a final ruling.

no authority to act on behalf of the Loan Office. Because removal of respondents
as officers and directors constitutes an adequate remedy at law, there is no legal
basis to keep them under preliminary injunction in the face of the said legal remedy.
"4. The preliminary injunction entered in this case should be converted
to a permanent injunction as prayedfor in the contempt pleadings filed and on
record in this matter,"
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: Augusta Rose agrees that the contempt
pleadings filed by KaLynn Ninow pray for a permanent lnjiitu lion Becaxxse this is
relief going to the merits rather than contempt-type relief, it was proper for Augusta
Rose to plead under URCP 7(a) and 8 in response to KaLynn Ninow's contempt
pleadings. But no permanent injunction can be granted as part of the upcoming
evidentiary hearing on contempt because a permanent injunction is relief on the
merits that does not turn on whether or not Augusta Rose is in contempt of court.
Regardless of whether or not Augusta Rose is in contempt of court, a
permanent injunction should only be entered if the remedy at law is not adequate.
Because the removal of William Lowe and Augusta Rose as officers and
directors [as has now been effectively accomplished fronpmnd after April 6, 2005,
effective July 8, 2005] is an adequate remedy at law that fully protects KaLynn
Ninow's rightful interests, there is no legal basis for issuing a permanent injunction.
"4 (continued). Any stay of the contempt proceeding will prejudice
Petitioner in her attempts to protect the estate from Respondentsf repeated and
continual attempts to improperly exercise control over the assets of the estate."
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: Having been removed as an officer and
director, Augusta Rose asserts no right to exercise control over the assets of the
estate, she is not engaged in any attempt to exercise control over any such assets,
and she will not do so absent further court order providing a basis for her to do so.
Her pending defamation and unjust enrichment claims seek no such order.

CONCLUSION
If anything, KaLynn Ninow's memorandum of July 8> 2005, shows how
confusing it is for her to try to mix a contempt proceeding with the merits. Based
on this, it will be helpful if the court stays the evidentiary hearing on contempt until
KaLynn Mnowfirstwraps up everything on the merits and advises the court she
has done so. At that point, a contempt hearing can be efficient, fair, and orderly.
The admission made in thefirstsentence is extremely helpful in bringing the
proceedings under this probate number to a close. KaLynn Ninow's interests are
fully protected by the removal of Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose as officers and directors.
The admission confirms Augusta Rose has no interest in the May 29, 2002,
petition. Based on her own admission, KaLynn Ninow should move to promptly
release Augusta Rose from the May 29, 2002, petition and lift the injunction./ The
motion for a stay should be QRANTiD to help $p Ms. Ninow into taking action.
DATED THIS 15TH DAY O^ JULYJ

ROBERT IffiN^Y COPIER
Attorney to/ William Lowe and Augusta Rose
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
True copies of the foregoing were mailed on July 15, 2005, to
Daniel Van Woerkom, Sandra Weeks and Hala Afu
2975 West Executive Parkway, Suite 414
LehiUT 8404$

Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow
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David Scofieid and Ronald Piice
\
111 East Broadway, Suite 340
\
SLCUT 84111
I
\
Attorneys for DDTS Propertied LLC

Ray Martineau
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City UT 84106
AttorneyMr Cathy Jean Libin
/
ondCf^rffLyknBtitters
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LAW OFFICES
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OBERT H

ENRY V^OPIER

ATTORNEY AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT

TAX COURT BAR NUMBER CR4093
COLORADO BAR NUMBER 36469
UTAH BAR NUMBER 727
MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
ADMITTED TO PRACTICE BEFORE THE TAX COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. BEFORE THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT IN DENVER. COLORADO. AND BEFORE ALL
FEDERAL AND STATE TRIAL COURTS AND APPELLATE COURTS VENUED IN COLORADO AND UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY MAIL
17 EAST 400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

SALT LAKE
DENVER
TOLL FREE

(801) 531-0099
(303) 337-0099
(888) 737-0099

July 15, 2005
Augusta Rose
7179 South 350 East
Midvale UT 84047
William T. Lowe
3939 South Alberly Way
Salt Lake City UT 84124
Re: Estate of Gary G Pahl
Dear Augusta and Bill:
KaLynn Ninow has now formally admitted that you have no interest in her May 29, 2002,
petition. This vindicates our prediction that she would not pursue that petition against you
beyond the May 1, 2003, summary judgment. In my opinion, this admission also means
that your removal as officers and directors of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., will be
effective as to Ms. Ninow once Ms. Ninow has Judge Lewis lift the preliminary injunction.
I now advise you that, based on this July 8, 2005, admission by Ms. Ninow, once the
preliminary injunction is lifted, you will have been effectively removed as officers and/or
directors of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and will lack any authority to control it or
to exercise the rights of seisin and possession over any assets controlled by the corporation.
On another subject, you know that I asked opposing counsel to stipulate to continuing the
July*21, 2005, hearing before Judge Lewis in this probate and have asked my opponents in
three other cases for the same courtesy as to matters set on July 21 and 22, 2005, so I can
help a dear out-of-state friend with transportation and emotional support as she undergoes
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Augusta Rose
William T. Lowe
July 15, 2005
Page Two
surgery to remove a lymph node in order to study it for cancer. This arose as the result of
a mammogram taken after the July 21, 2005 hearing had already been set. So far, all of
the opposing attorneys in the other cases have graciously agreed to continuances. [One
before Judge Lewis in which I represent a criminal defendant; one before Judge Himonas
in which I represent a blind mother who I am defending against the petitioner's post-trial
efforts to set aside the grant of joint legal and physical custody that I secured for her in a
trial before Judge Noel; and one before U.S. District Judge Sam in which I represent one
of the defendants in a corporate civil action set for hearing at 2:00 p.m. on July 21, 2005.]
I am unable to predict whether Ms. Ninow's counsel will extend similar courtesy, and, if
not, whether Judge Lewis will grant my continuance request without such an agreement by
opposing counsel. I will keep you posted on this and I will let you know as soon as I know.
Iliank you for giving me the opportijriity to serve as your attorney.

Third Judic'?! Oisfrict

AUG 1 9 2805
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for Respondents
William Lowe and Augusta Rose
[As Attorney for Augusta Rose]
17 East 400 South
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Telephone (801) 272-2222

SALT LAKE COUNTY
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Deputy cierk"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION

In the matter of the estate of

FINAL ORDER ON THE
MAY 29, 2002, PETITION

GARY G. PAHL,
Deceased.

Probate No. 003901101
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

In the matter of the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, deceased
[Ninow v. Lowe I (Estate of Pahl)]

KaLynn Ninow
Petitioner
vs.
William Lowe. Augusta Rose, Robert Mortensen,
and Grand Staircase Land Company, Inc.
Respondents

Augusta Rose
Third-party Petitioner
vs.
Ryan Pahl, KaLvnn Ninow. Richard Ninow, and Does I-V
Third-party Respondents
Kalynn Ninow having admitted by written filing dated July 8, 2005, that she
will not pursue the merits of her May 29, 2002, petition beyond the May 1, 2003,
order granting summary judgment, the court, being sufiBciently advised, ORDERS:
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1. All remaining claims under the May 29, 2002, petition are dismissed.
2. William Lowe and Augusta Rose are hereby ordered removed as officers
and directors of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and, as they have no authority
over Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., by virtue of this removal, the preliminary
injunction that was entered in connection with the May 29, 2002, petition is lifted.
3. Augusta Rose's defamation claims against KaLynn Ninow and Ryan Pahl
remain pending. The judgment and permanent injunction against Richard Ninow
in favor of Augusta Rose entered by Judge Tyrone E. Medley remain in full effect.
4. All unadjudicated URCP 11 motions remains pending.
DATED THIS

/ t y ^ ¥ * § g ^ U G U S T , 2005.
IT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of this [proposed] order was mailed on August 12, 2005, to
Daniel Van Woerkom, Sandra Weeks and Hala Afu
2975 West/Executive Parkway, Suite 414
Lehi UT M043 \
Attorney^ for KaLynp Ninoy/

ROBERT IffiNRY COPIEI
^tomeyjfetfwMam Lowe and Augusta Rose
[As Attorney for Augusta Rose]
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ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for Respondents
William Lowe and Augusta Rose
17 East 400 South
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Telephone (801) 272-2222
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION

In the matter of the estate of

WITHDRAWAL OF MOTIONS
[AS HAVING BECOME MOOT]

GARY G. PAHL,
Deceased.

Probate No. 003901101
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

In the matter of the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, deceased
[Ninow v. Lowe I (Estate of Pahl)]

KaLynn Ninow
Petitioner
vs.
William Lowe. Augusta Rose. Robert Mortensen,
and Grand Staircase Land Company, Inc.
Respondents

Augusta Rose
Third-party Petitioner
vs.
Ryan Pahl. KaLynn Ninow. Richard Ninow, and Does I-V
Third-party Respondents
The court entered her final order on the May 29, 2002, petition on August
19, 2005. The ten days for moving for a new trial or to amend under URCP 59(a)
and (b) and/or (e) expired September 2, 2005. KaLynn Ninow did not file a timely

URCP 59 motion on or before September 2, 2005, and, as of September 9, 2005,
no such motion appears in the docket. The following motions are now withdrawn
by the moving part[ies] as having been mooted by the August 19, 2005, final order:
#

Motion to Set Jury Trial filed on August 25, 2005.

•

Lowe's URCP 41(b) Motion for Final Order Dismissing the May 29, 2002,
Petition as to the Respondents Lowe and Rose filed on August 25, 2005.

* Motion to Reverse th/April \2005, Ruling Rei/Q^seguera Order filed on
September I, 200$
DATED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of hereof was mailed on September 10, 2005, to
Daniel Van Woerkom, Sandra Weeks and Hala Afu
2975 West Esfecutiv<\Parkway, Suite^414
. Lehi UT 84043
Attorneys foi KaLynn\Ninow

ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for Respondents/Appellants
William Lowe and Augusta Rose
17 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 272-2222

S P 1 5 2005
SALT LAKE pOfJNl

By

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DEPARTMENT

In the matter of the estate of

NOTICE OF APPEAL

GARY G. PAHL,
Deceased.

Probate No. 003901101
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Respondents William Lowe and Augusta Rose, through their attorney,
Robert Henry Copier, appeal from the Third District Court to the Utah
Supreme Court the Final Order on the May 29, 2002, Petition signed by the
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on August 16, 2005, and entered on August 19,
2005, together with all prior orders entered under or consolidated into this
probate or any proceeding therein that have not previously been reviewed on
the merits by an appellate court, including, but not limited to, the order by
Judge Hilder setting aside the default judgment, the order by Judge Lewis
denying the motion to vacate the order by Judge Hilder setting aside the
default judgment, the order denying the motion to proceed against the surety
who made the TRO undertaking, and all orders and rulings extending the
preliminary injunction beyond the grant in 2002 of the summary judgment
adjudicating the underlying merits of the May 29, 2002, probate petition.

A true copy of the foregoing was this-day mailed to:
DANIEL VAN WOERKOM
SANDRA WEEKS
HALA AFU
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, PC
2975 WEST EXECUTIVE PARKWAY - 414
LEHI, UTT84043-0255
-TH

DATED THIS 15 m DAY/OF SEPTEMBER, 200

